

Loyalty, Competence, and the Allocation of Office under Threat

Evidence from Qing China

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Abstract

When a state is threatened, does the kind of threat change which offices a ruler gives to insiders with an inherited tie to the regime? In nineteenth-century China the eighteen provinces faced rebellions and foreign wars, and annual chronologies record whether each governor-general, governor, fiscal commissioner, and judicial commissioner from 1825 to 1911 belonged to the Eight Banners, the dynasty's hereditary service elite. Comparing each province with provinces where no war began in the same years or shortly before, I find that the two kinds of threat moved the provincial executive differently. In the three years after a rebellion's onset the Banner share of governors-general and governors rose by 49 percentage points relative to comparison provinces (wild $p = 0.008$ with clusters by governor-general jurisdiction), with jointly insignificant differences before onset; after a foreign war's onset no rise is detected, and the external-minus-internal contrast is -67 points ($p = 0.004$). Much of the rebellion estimate, and part of the contrast, comes from one year of the largest rebellion, the Taiping war: the six provinces that rebel armies reached in 1853. It also depends on dating that war by when it reached each province rather than by its outbreak. Under rebellion the executive's rise exceeded the mean change in the two commissions below it by 49 points. Whether rulers give insiders the offices that command troops and money can depend on the kind of threat.

JEL codes: N45, D73, J45

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1 Introduction

Governments under threat must decide whom to trust with power. A government facing an insurgency or a foreign war has to decide who will command its troops, raise and spend its money, and run its provinces and its courts, and the officials it trusts most are often not the ones best able to do those jobs. Since 1945, civil wars have killed about five times as many people as wars between states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). An insurgency and a foreign war need not call for the same answer, and the answer may also differ across offices: a trusted insider in the office that commands troops and money is a different decision from one in the office that runs the courts.

Parts of this choice are well studied. Regimes that fear coups staff their armies by loyalty, often with members of the ruler's own ethnic group (Quinlivan, 1999; Harkness, 2018); such armies fight worse (Quinlivan, 1999; Talmadge, 2015), and building or dismantling them can itself provoke coups (Harkness, 2018). Regimes that exclude rivals from power invite civil war (Roessler, 2011). In the United States in the 2000s, federal programs run by presidents' campaign and party appointees received lower management ratings than those run by other appointees or by career managers (Lewis, 2008; Gallo and Lewis, 2012). African rulers share cabinet posts across ethnic groups roughly in proportion to population, even in the most powerful ministries, with a premium for their own group (Francois et al., 2015). Economists model the underlying trade-off between loyalty and competence (Egorov and Sonin, 2011). The kind of threat a regime faces shapes how it organizes its army and its coercive institutions (Talmadge, 2015; Greitens, 2016), and in models of state capacity the risk of external war raises the return to building fiscal capacity while internal conflict and political instability lower it (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010); less is known about whether threats from inside and from outside change the allocation of insiders in a state's civil administration in the same way, and in the same offices. Threats are not alike, and government is not one office.

This paper asks whether the kind of threat changes which offices rulers give to connected officials. For the Qing itself, Chen et al. (2023) show that over 1650–1911 the court paired Manchu superiors with Han officials more often where governing was harder, and Xi (2019) shows that internal armed conflict shaped the sanctions, promotions, and appointments of provincial governors; the question here is whether a rebellion and a foreign war changed the allocation differently when they arrived. Both kinds of war must be won, so ability matters in both; what differs is the risk that comes with the resources. A rebellion is fought inside the ruler's territory, with troops and money raised there. The officials who command those troops and that money can withhold them or build a following of their own, so a rebellion raises the value of reliability in the offices it strengthens. A foreign war also puts troops and money in officials' hands, and an ambitious official can use it to

build power of his own, but the enemy is outside the empire, and an official is less likely to turn those resources against the ruler or carry them over to the enemy; such a war raises the value of officials who can defeat that enemy more than it raises the value of reliability. Offices differ as well: an official who commands troops or runs a treasury holds resources that can be redirected, while one who runs the courts does not. If rulers weigh loyalty against ability in this way, rebellion should pull connected officials into the offices that control troops and money, and foreign war should not. The logic applies most directly to the provincial executive, the office that held a province's troops and money together.

The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was a conquest regime: Manchus from beyond the Great Wall ruled an empire whose population was overwhelmingly Han, and the Eight Banners, the hereditary military and administrative organization that had carried out the conquest, remained a distinct group within it (Crossley, 1990; Elliott, 2001; Rhoads, 2000). In the nineteenth century the dynasty faced both kinds of threat: large rebellions inside the empire and, on its coasts and borders, wars with Britain, France, and Japan and, in 1900, with an alliance of eight foreign powers. Three features of this setting make the allocation unusually easy to observe. First, the dynasty had a clearly defined group of insiders whose tie to it was inherited: the Bannermen, members of the Banners, which contained Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial divisions and remained a small minority of the population. The annual chronologies record Banner affiliation for every senior provincial officeholder (Qian, 1980), so membership of the group is recorded in the source for each official rather than inferred from his conduct. The outcome in this paper is where the court placed members of that group (Section 2.2). Second, every province had the same tiers of senior civil office, and they differed in their control over troops and money. At the top was the executive: a governor-general, who held authority over the civil and military officials of a jurisdiction of one to three provinces, a governor, who administered one province, or, in most provinces, both. Below them were a fiscal commissioner, who ran the province's treasury, and a judicial commissioner, who reviewed criminal cases and supervised its courts (Figure 1). Statute fixed Manchu–Han proportions in the metropolitan boards but not in the provinces (Fairbank, 1953), so where Bannermen served in the provinces was a choice. Third, threats of both kinds recurred, often in the same provinces at different times. The Qing empire was the most populous state in the world, and the register used here contains five foreign wars and five major domestic conflicts between 1839 and 1901, among them the Taiping war, which killed tens of millions (Platt, 2012). Six of the eighteen provinces were reached by both kinds of war, and all but Sichuan by at least one (Figure 2).

Why not study the executive alone? Its importance by itself does not predict who holds it: an office that commands troops is where a disloyal official could do most harm, but also where an incompetent one could lose the war. What the trade-off predicts is that the answer depends on the

threat, which the executive alone can show, and that a threat which raises the value of reliability should move connected officials into the offices with most authority relative to the others. The two commissions supply that comparison. They were senior offices in the same province, filled from the same pool of officials, in the same years and under the same war, so comparing the executive with them removes any change that moved all three offices alike, such as a general turn by the court toward its own, and separates a general shift toward Bannermen from one concentrated in the offices with most authority. Had the court simply turned to Bannermen everywhere, all three offices would have moved together.

The main result is that the two kinds of threat moved the provincial executive differently. I compare each province with provinces where no war began in the same years or shortly before, one episode at a time, and date the Taiping war by the arrival of its armies in each province. In the three years after a rebellion's onset, the Banner share of governors-general and governors rose by 49 percentage points relative to comparison provinces. The estimate measures who held executive authority over a province, so a governor-general enters every province of his jurisdiction; I therefore cluster by jurisdiction as well as by province, and the wild bootstrap p -value is 0.0078 (0.0004 with province clusters). Before onset the executive coefficients are about -9 points in each year and jointly insignificant. After a foreign war's onset no rise is detected (-18 points), and the external-minus-internal contrast is -67 points ($p = 0.0039$ with jurisdiction clusters and 0.0021 with province clusters). The contrast compares rebellion and foreign war as the Qing experienced them, including their differences in scale and duration. The executive result holds when the stacked comparisons are weighted by their numbers of exposed provinces, when foreign wars are dated by the first fighting in each province they reached or their windows end with the war, when each post is measured by its incumbent at the end of the year, and when onsets are aligned with the chronologies' calendar years (Section 4.7). Its precision comes mostly from the provinces that rebel armies reached in 1853 and from dating the Taiping war by arrival; its sign holds without them, at $+24.9$ points without the 1853 comparison and $+17.9$ with common onsets. The rise is larger in the governor-generalship, the command over several provinces' troops, at 57 points, than in the governorship, at 18 (Section 4.2).

Behind these shares are dated appointments. As the Taiping armies reached the Yangzi and the north in 1853–1855, the court gave the regional commands on their path, the governor-generalships, to Bannermen: the lower Yangzi command in 1853, and the middle Yangzi command (Huguang) three times, when its Han governor-general died in the fighting in early 1854 and twice more when his Banner successors were dismissed. Three of these four appointees came from the Banner garrison generalships, a route the court also used for posts the war had not reached. Bannermen also received about half of the theater governorships. They received governorships the war had

not reached as well, so the governor-generalships, more than the governorships, set the theater apart (Sections 4.3 and 5 name the appointments). The chronologies date these decisions, and the same comparison run on them shows that posts the war reached changed hands more often and that Bannermen there were dismissed about as often as others: the court filled the posts the war opened, rather than visibly keeping its own in place. From 1860, as the regional armies, raised in the provinces by officials and gentry outside the regular military establishment, took over the war, their Han commanders took most of the theater governorships and some of the regional commands, although a Bannerman held Huguang until 1867. In the wars with France and Japan, the governors and governors-general of the theater provinces were Han officials, several of them with military records earned against the rebellions. The pattern is consistent with a court that, in the first years of a rebellion, placed members of its hereditary service group in the offices that commanded a province's troops.

The design compares each exposed province only with provinces where no registered war began during the comparison window or in the years just before it; each episode forms its own comparison and the comparisons are stacked (Cengiz et al., 2019; Wing et al., 2024). A pooled two-way regression would also compare newly exposed provinces with provinces already at war (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille, 2020); Appendix B.2 shows how much that changes the estimates. The rebellion comparison rests on the route of the Taiping armies, which reached Guangxi in 1851, Hunan and Hubei in 1852, the lower Yangzi and the north in 1853, and Zhejiang only in 1858; Shandong enters the 1853 comparison through the Nian, which the main comparison dates to 1853, when its bands consolidated. The event-study estimates do not reject equal pre-onset paths for any of the three offices (Figure 4). The executive estimate remains between +24.9 and +55.4 points when any single stack or province is removed. The executive series comes from a new, complete transcription of the governor and governor-general tables (Appendix A.3).

The commissions below the governor moved much less. The fiscal share rose by 19 points and the judicial share fell by 20, so the executive's response to rebellion exceeded the mean response of the two commissions by 49 points (wild $p = 0.0038$ with province clusters and 0.031 with jurisdiction clusters): the rebellion moved insiders into the office that held a province's troops and money, much more than into the offices below it. The commission estimates are less precise, and a joint test does not reject equal war-type contrasts across the three offices ($p = 0.059$ with province clusters and 0.188 with jurisdiction clusters). The executive estimates are the same under every coding of Banner identity, including the question marks with which Qian flags 86 commissioners' affiliations as to be verified (Section 4.7).

Why the provincial executive? Internal conflict in nineteenth-century China was fought by provincial armies financed through new provincial levies, and governors-general and governors

raised troops and levies to fight it; the officials who directed them could withhold them or build a following of their own (Kuhn, 1970; Bai et al., 2023), and Xi (2019) notes that governors' fiscal and military powers expanded after the Taiping war. In 1854 the court made Zeng Guofan, the commander of the Hunan Army, acting governor of Hubei and withdrew the appointment a week later. Later writers connect the reversal to a chief minister's warning, recorded in 1887 by a former member of Zeng's staff, that a commoner who could raise more than ten thousand followers with one call might not be a blessing for the state; the official record gives other reasons (Section 2.2). The governor-general held the widest of these commands, over the troops of several provinces. Officials facing a foreign enemy needed military ability against that enemy, which a hereditary tie did not supply. Section 2.4 states these predictions.

The paper contributes to the study of political selection. Models of the loyalty–competence trade-off and of delegation (Egorov and Sonin, 2011; Aghion and Tirole, 1997), and evidence on connections and patronage in public employment (Jia et al., 2015; Xu, 2018; Colonnelli et al., 2020), mostly treat the ruler's choice as how much reliability to buy. Work on power sharing shows that standing threats of coups and revolts lead rulers to share even the most powerful offices across groups, with a premium for their own (Francois et al., 2015); this paper asks how the onset of a particular threat changes where the ruler's own group serves. The Qing evidence shows that the answer depends on the threat: in the provincial executive, the response to rebellion differed sharply from the response to foreign war. Under rebellion it also depended on the office: the same rebellion moved a connected group into the offices that commanded a province's troops, and much less into the offices below them. The coup-proofing literature finds that internal threats push rulers toward loyalty in the security forces (Quinlivan, 1999; Talmadge, 2015; Roessler, 2011); the evidence here is consistent with the same logic reaching the civil offices that controlled a province's troops. It also carries to personnel the distinction that the study of state capacity draws between external war, a threat with a common interest, and internal conflict (Besley and Persson, 2010). Two studies of the Qing are closest to this paper. Chen et al. (2023) show that over 1650–1911 the court paired Manchu superiors with Han officials more often where governing was harder, measured by extreme weather, especially where Han officials held more discretion. Xi (2019) shows that internal armed conflict shaped the sanctions and promotions of provincial governors, that Manchus were favored for promotion to the top, and that conflict in a province made a Han appointee to its governorship more likely; his main coding counts Hanjun (Han-martial) Bannermen as Han, whereas this paper counts them as Bannermen. Both fit parts of the evidence here: the rise is larger in the governor-generalship than in the governorship, as pairing Banner superiors with Han officials would imply, and from 1860 the regional armies' Han commanders took most of the theater governorships, in line with his finding on Han appointees. This paper differs from them in three ways. First, it compares two kinds

of threat. The executive's Banner share showed no detectable rise after foreign wars (-17.9 points, SE 14.6), and its response differed from the response to rebellion by -66.6 points (wild $p = 0.0039$ with jurisdiction clusters). An account in which any war that made a province harder to govern drew in the ruler's group fits this pattern less well; one in which the court's use of its own group tracked the discretion it delegated, as in Section 2.4, remains consistent with it. Second, unlike the long-run association in Chen et al. (2023), it measures the change in the first years after a war reached a province, against provinces where no war began in the same years. Third, it compares three tiers of provincial office and uses the dated appointments and departures to describe how the change came about. The career evidence connects to the wartime networks studied by Bai et al. (2023) and to the decline of Manchu and Mongol officials studied by Guo et al. (2026): some officials who left an office were advancing to another.

Section 2 describes the offices and states the hypothesis, Section 3 the data and design, Section 4 the results, and Section 5 the careers of the officials involved; Section 6 concludes.

2 The Appointment Problem under War

2.1 Institutional ties and the authority to appoint

The emperor made every senior provincial appointment, but the choice combined his authority with information supplied by serving officials. That division matters because a provincial sponsor could bring a candidate's service to the court's attention. The Boards of Civil Office and War administered the respective branches of selection, and for senior civil posts names were presented for imperial choice. Governors and governors-general recommended candidates, assessed subordinates, and requested acting appointments (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 110). Formal appointment authority and knowledge of a candidate's service were thus located in different parts of government (Guy, 2010). Provincial civil posts formed one ladder: an official could rise from county magistrate through prefect and circuit intendant to judicial commissioner, fiscal commissioner, governor, and governor-general, so the two commissions were adjacent rungs below the executive, with the fiscal commission the higher (Section 2.3). In wartime the same machinery ran faster: posts a war reached changed hands more often (Section 4.3), and service in the field, brought to the court's attention by the commanders an official served under, became a route into the commissions for officials outside the Banners (Section 5).

The Eight Banners supplied an established institutional connection to the ruling dynasty. Organized under Nurhaci in the 1610s as the military and administrative framework of the conquest, the Banners came to contain Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun (Han-martial) divisions; Banner affiliation

and a simple Manchu–Han ethnic classification are not interchangeable (Crossley, 1990; Elliott, 2001; Rhoads, 2000). Membership was hereditary.¹ Banner households drew stipends, served in the capital and in provincial garrisons, and had privileged routes into office, while remaining a small minority of the population (Elliott, 2001). In the capital, statute paired Manchu and Han incumbents in each board; for the provincial governorships it fixed no proportions (Fairbank, 1953). In 1825–1849 Bannermen held 44 percent of executive posts and 22 and 29 percent of the fiscal and judicial commissions in the eighteen provinces (Appendix Table A2). This inherited relationship of service and privilege could make affiliation informative about political ties without making all members equally capable or dependable. The court could also develop confidence in non-Banner officials through officeholding, demonstrated service, and personal recommendation.

Entry and advancement drew on several sources of qualification. Examinations, purchased credentials, hereditary privilege, and recommendation all formed part of the recruitment system (Elman, 2000; Chen et al., 2020), and Bannermen had further routes of their own, through clerkships reserved for them in the capital boards and through the imperial guard (Section 2.2). Different credentials could coexist within a person’s career. Affiliation, experience, sponsorship, and assessment are distinct features of the appointment problem. The empirical comparison measures affiliation, while appointment histories provide evidence on the other features.

The court’s use of the Banner tie was selective, and the clearest evidence of its limits comes from the Xianfeng court itself. Sushun, the dominant figure in that court during the late 1850s, pressed for the use of the Hunan Army against the Taiping, secured approval for the memorials of Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi, protected Zuo Zongtang from impeachment and had him promoted out of turn, and proposed cutting the stipends of the Eight Banners (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 387). The same court that placed Han commanders over the provincial armies drew on Bannermen for provincial finance in those years. Banner representation also changed as the war went on (Section 3.2 discusses two readings of the later decline): in its first years Bannermen took most of the theater’s governor-generalships and many of its governorships, and by the late 1850s field command had gone to Han commanders with records in the war, while Bannermen still held many of the fiscal commissions (Sections 4.2 and 5).

¹Membership could also change within the Banners: families could be raised (*taiqi*) from bondservant to regular companies, from the lower five to the upper three banners, or from Hanjun into Manchu banners. Such moves leave Banner affiliation, which pools all divisions, unchanged. Large-scale release from the Banners came earlier, when Hanjun bannermen were moved into the civilian population under the Qianlong emperor (Elliott, 2001). The commission chronologies list 5,211 commissioner-years, including those of Xinjiang and Taiwan, which are outside the panel. In 14 of them an official marked as a Bannerman in other years appears without that mark (in 13 with no mark and in one with a question mark), and in 5 more an official who carries a question mark in other years appears with no mark (Section 3.1).

2.2 What a Banner mark records

The variable used throughout is whether Qian records an officeholder as a member of the Eight Banners. It records membership of a group, not the route by which a man entered office, and not his loyalty. Bannermen reached the governorships through the regular examinations, through clerkships reserved for Bannermen in the capital boards, through the imperial guard, and through purchase, and all are coded alike.² When this paper refers to the court's use of the Banner tie, it means that the court appointed members of this group. It does not mean that Bannermen were more loyal than others, or even that the court believed them to be. Whether the court did is a question about its reasons, and the sources seldom state them: edicts announce an appointment, and sometimes the service it rewards, but rarely say why one candidate was preferred to another.

The best-documented case shows both a concern about commanders with followings of their own and how hard it is to read the court's motives. In October 1854, after the Hunan Army of Zeng Guofan and regular troops retook Wuchang, the court confirmed Yang Pei, a Hanjun Bannerman, as governor-general of Huguang and made Zeng acting governor of Hubei; a week later it withdrew Zeng's appointment and named a Han civil official governor (Qing court, n.d.c, juan 144–145). Writing thirty-three years later, Xue Fucheng, a former member of Zeng's staff, attributed Zeng's years of frustrated ambition to a chief minister's warning that a commoner who could raise more than ten thousand followers with one call “may not be a blessing for the state” (Xue, 1887); later writers connect the warning to the reversal. Historians dispute who the minister was, and Kikuchi reads the reversal as the emperor's fear of Han forces outside the bureaucracy together with the opposition of Han elites from the southeastern coastal provinces (Kikuchi, 2017). The official record gives other reasons, chiefly that Zeng was needed on the Yangzi rather than in a provincial office (Qing court, n.d.c, juan 145–146). Appendix C.6 sets out the sources.

The episode bears on one premise of the account in Section 2.4: in Xue's account, a chief minister treated a commander's ability to raise his own following as a danger to the state. It does not show that the court regarded Bannermen as more loyal: the account is late and second-hand, the critics of Zeng whom the sources name were themselves Han (Qi Junzao among them; Appendix C.6), and the official record gives other reasons. Section 4.3 adds a related check: Banner governors and governors-general in the theater provinces were not less likely than others to be dismissed, demoted, or killed, although the comparison is imprecise.

²Among the Bannermen appointed to the theater governorships and governor-generalships in 1853–1855, Fuji and Qinglin were metropolitan graduates (*jinshi*) of 1833 and 1841 and Yinggui a provincial graduate (*juren*) of 1821; Yiliang and Jirhanga had begun as Banner clerks (*bithesi*) in the Boards of Punishments and of Works, and Guanwen had risen through the imperial guard. Yuxian, governor of Shanxi in 1900, had bought his way into a prefectship (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 371, 388, 395, 397, 427, 440, 465).

2.3 Three connected responsibilities

Figure 1 places the three offices in the provincial hierarchy, and Table 1 summarizes them.




Figure 1. Who governed a Qing province, and who the Bannermen were

Notes: The three shaded offices are those observed in every province-year, 1825–1911. Governors-general could have jurisdiction over up to three provinces; governors over one. Ranks follow Zhao et al. (1928, juan 116); responsibilities follow Guy (2010) and Hucker (1985). Banner background: Elliott (2001), Crossley (1990), Rhoads (2000); provincial proportions: Fairbank (1953). Executive and commission Banner shares before 1850 are the means in Appendix Table A2.

Governors-general and governors coordinated provincial administration, supervised subordinates, and exercised military responsibilities. The governor-general held authority over the civil and military officials of his whole jurisdiction and commanded his own brigade of Green Standard troops; the governor administered one province and acted with the governor-general above him (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 116). Governors-general could have jurisdiction over more than one province, making executive appointments relevant to several provincial administrations at once. The executive series combines the two posts, counting a governor-general in every province of his jurisdiction; Section 4.2 also uses each post separately.

The fiscal commissioner, or *buzheng shi*, supervised provincial treasury and revenue affairs and participated in the administration and assessment of local officials. The judicial commissioner, or *ancha shi*, reviewed criminal cases and oversaw prisons, discipline, and postal-relay functions. The English labels “finance” and “justice” summarize responsibilities that were broader and sometimes overlapping. The fiscal commission ranked above the judicial commission: junior second grade rather than senior third grade (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 116).

Table 1. Offices, responsibilities, and observation units

Office	Principal responsibilities	Underlying records	Provincial contributions
Governors-general and governors	Executive coordination, civil and military administration, recommendations	2,787	3,629
Fiscal commissioner	Revenue, treasury, and related provincial administration	2,552	2,552
Judicial commissioner	Criminal review, prisons, discipline, and related administration	2,609	2,609
Total		7,948	8,790

Notes: Annual records cover 1825–1911. They are recorded officeholder appearances, not unique people or new hires. Shared governors-general contribute to each constituent province. Annual provincial cells can contain more than one official. Responsibilities are based on Guy (2010), Hucker (1985), and Zhao et al. (1928, juan 110, 116). The judicial series spans a late-dynasty title and remit change, discussed in Appendix A.

These offices formed a connected hierarchy. Judicial commissioners could advance to finance; fiscal commissioners could advance into executive office. Movement was not automatic, and the offices did not exhaust the possible destinations of an official. Nevertheless, the existence of these routes matters for interpreting composition. A decline in Banner representation in justice might reflect replacement by non-Banner entrants, promotion of Banner incumbents, or both. The cross-office comparison spans differences in responsibility, rank and career routes together.

Regular military command did not form a common set of provincial vacancies and is not part of the main comparison; Appendix D examines the provincial *tidu*, the senior Green Standard commanders.

2.4 Threats, offices, and the value of loyalty

The appointment problem combines the value of a candidate’s preparation for a task with the political reliability attributed to him. A simple representation is

$$i_{jct}^* \in \arg \max_{i \in \mathcal{A}_{jt}} \{v_{jc}a_{ij} + r_{jc}\ell_i + s_{ijct}\}, \quad (1)$$

where j is the office, c the threat, a_{ij} task-specific ability, ℓ_i perceived reliability, and s_{ijct} sponsorship and reassignment considerations. Prior service and eligibility restrict the candidates in $\mathcal{A}_{jt}$. The distinction between a_{ij} and ℓ_i allows for able Bannermen and trusted non-Banner officials.

The weights v_{jc} and r_{jc} depend on the office and the threat. Two features of an office matter. The first is control over resources that could be withheld from the ruler or turned against him: troops, and funds whose use is not fixed in advance. The second is the task. An office that faces an enemy army or navy needs officials whose ability against that enemy has been shown, which a hereditary tie does not supply.

Rebellion raises r_{jc} in the offices whose control it expands. The Taiping war was fought by armies raised and paid in the provinces: governors raised troops and levies, and fiscal officials collected and disbursed new provincial revenues (Kuhn, 1970; Bai et al., 2023). The enemy was inside the empire, and an official who controlled these resources could withhold them or build a personal following; the regional armies that eventually defeated the Taiping did become a base of provincial power (Kuhn, 1970). Within the executive, the governor-general’s command reached furthest, over the troops of every province in his jurisdiction. The judicial commissions gained neither troops nor funds.

Foreign war raised the value of a_{ij} in the theater provinces: coastal defense and frontier campaigns needed commanders with a record against the enemy in question.

The distinction between workload and discretion matters for finance. *Fiscal workload* is the volume of resources an official must raise, coordinate, and deliver; a heavier workload raises the value of relevant experience. *Fiscal discretion* is the authority to redirect those resources. Earmarking, prior claims, and supervision can let workload grow without a corresponding expansion of discretion, and reliability matters more when an official gains latitude over use. The rebellions widened the fiscal commissioner’s discretion less than the executive’s in one respect. A major new levy, the transit tax (*lijin*), began at Yangzhou in late 1853 and spread through the provinces from 1855, mostly after the first appointments studied here, and was collected by bureaus that governors and commanders set up and staffed with their own deputies (Luo, 1936; Wei and Xi, 2023), so the new revenue did not necessarily pass through the fiscal commissioner. This weakens the fiscal prediction relative to the executive one. The point was added after the estimates had been seen.

Hypothesis. If Banner affiliation is informative about perceived reliability and candidate pools are held fixed, rebellion should raise Banner representation in the executive and fiscal offices, relative to the judicial office, by more than foreign war does. The hypothesis was developed from the sources and a first look at the office pattern, and the finance–justice ordering below was formulated after that pattern had been observed (Appendix B). Two implications follow. First, the external-minus-internal contrasts $\Delta_j \equiv \beta_{jE} - \beta_{jI}$ (Equation (5); G denotes the executive, governors-general and

governors together) differ across offices, with Δ_G and Δ_F below Δ_J . The primary test is the joint test of $\Delta_G = \Delta_F = \Delta_J$. The executive coefficient β_{GI} , which Section 4 reports first, is the clearest single estimate; the hypothesis itself concerns how the external-minus-internal contrast differs across offices. Second, the two commissions were adjacent rungs of one career ladder; the fiscal commission controlled funds and the judicial commission did not, although the two also differed in rank. For years one to three after onset define $\theta_I \equiv \beta_{FI} - \beta_{JI}$ and $\theta_E \equiv \beta_{FE} - \beta_{JE}$. The implied ordering is

$$\theta_I > \theta_E \iff \Delta_F - \Delta_J = \theta_E - \theta_I < 0. \quad (2)$$

This ordering does not require any single coefficient to have a particular sign. Both implications concern observed composition; reading them as the court's preferences also requires the candidate pools in Equation (1) to be comparable across the provinces compared. The data record Banner membership, not ℓ_i ; the link between the two is an assumption of the hypothesis, which the shares do not measure (Section 2.2). The hypothesis treats governors-general and governors as one executive office; Section 4.2 splits them, and the implication that the post with the wider command responded more was drawn after that split was estimated. Applied to the executive alone, and provided that rebellion raises the weight on reliability relative to ability in that office and that the other considerations in Equation (1), sponsorship and the candidate pool, do not offset it, the account also implies that rebellion raises the executive's Banner share ($\beta_{GI} > 0$) and by more than foreign war does ($\Delta_G < 0$); the relative ordering alone does not imply this. These single-office implications were not designated as the primary test. Section 4 reports three layers: the executive implications, which the data support most firmly; the reading of them as a trade-off between reliability and ability, which the data are consistent with but do not identify separately from other accounts (Sections 2.2 and 4.3); and the primary test, which does not reject equal contrasts across the offices at the five percent level.

Careers connect the offices. A Banner judicial commissioner promoted to finance is an outflow from one office and an inflow to the other: the transfer shifts the distribution across offices without changing the combined headcount. Following officials into their next posts distinguishes promotion from departure, and Section 5 does so for the later Taiping years.

3 Data and Empirical Comparison

3.1 Annual officeholder composition

The design needs a consistently defined outcome for each office across provinces and over time. I use Qian Shifu's *Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao* (Qian, 1980) to construct an annual panel covering

eighteen provinces from 1825 through 1911: 1,566 province-years and 4,698 civil office cells, each of which has recorded composition. These repeated observations allow the same outcome definition to be used across responsibilities. Appendix A describes coverage and source conventions.

For office j in province p and year t , define

$$B_{pjt}^{\text{rec}} = 100 \frac{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{R}_{pjt}} \mathbf{1}\{i \text{ is recorded as Banner}\}}{|\mathcal{R}_{pjt}|}, \quad (3)$$

where $\mathcal{R}_{pjt}$ is the set of officeholder appearances recorded in the annual cell. Replacements and acting service can produce several names within one year. Appearances receive equal weight because arrival dates and service durations are not uniformly available. The outcome therefore measures annual recorded composition, not the identity of a fixed-date incumbent or the share of newly filled vacancies.

With one record, the measure is 0 or 100; with several, it averages the recorded identity indicators. Multiple holders with the same affiliation also produce an endpoint value. Its variation comes from differences in who is listed across provinces and years, including succession within the year. The source includes some nominal and explicitly not-assumed appointments, which establish appointment or advancement without necessarily establishing completed tenure. The separate dated-roster evidence measures presence in particular editions.

Affiliation follows the source's Banner markings (Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun Banners, and the imperial lineage), harmonized for each person: an official marked as a Bannerman in any year of the commission tables is coded Banner in every year, which affects 14 of the 5,211 commissioner-years in the chronologies, a count that includes Xinjiang and Taiwan, outside the panel; under the main coding it changes 13, because one of the 14 carries a question mark, which that coding already counts as Banner. The main coding also counts as Banner, in every year of the commission tables, an official whom Qian marks as a Bannerman in his governor or governor-general tables, which changes a further 23 commissioner-years of four officials. Qian prints a question mark in place of an affiliation for 86 commissioners (477 commissioner-years). His explanatory notes define the mark: the affiliation is "to be verified, but can broadly be judged to belong to the Manchu, Mongol, or Hanjun" Banners (Qian, 1980, vol. 1, Explanatory notes, p. 1). The main coding follows that definition and counts these officials as Bannermen. The CGED-Q rosters of 1850–1864, which list a Bannerman by banner and division and a civilian by native place, agree: of the 25 question-mark commissioners who served in 1849–1865, 19 appear in the rosters and all 19 are listed with a banner, as are all 31 marked Bannermen found, while 139 of the 142 officials found who are unmarked in the commission tables are listed by native place (Appendix Table A3). Table 2, Panel B, and Table 6 report the alternative coding that counts them as non-Banner, and Section 4.7 also reports marks

coded as printed in each year. The question mark is counted where it is printed: three officials who carry it in some years appear without a mark in five others, which are coded non-Banner. The two marks are treated differently because a Banner mark records membership of a hereditary group, which did not change from year to year, while the question mark records Qian's doubt about a particular entry. None of these five years falls inside a comparison window, so the choice does not affect the estimates. The executive series follows Qian's printed marks, harmonized for each person across his governor, governor-general, and commission tables; one governor, Hafen in Shanxi in 1853, carries a question mark, in an onset year that the comparison drops. The commission series is harmonized in the same way, so that each official has one identity across all of Qian's tables, apart from the five unmarked years of three question-mark officials noted above; Section 4.7 reports it harmonized within the commission tables only.³

All four series were transcribed from Qian's tables for this paper, one entry per official and year with its page reference: the fiscal and judicial series in Appendix A.2, and the governor and governor-general series in Appendix A.3.


3.2 Episodes, theaters, and local timing

The register contains five internal episodes—Taiping, Nian, the southwestern rebellions, the Northwest Muslim rebellion, and the Boxer movement—and five external episodes—the two Opium Wars, the Sino-French and Sino-Japanese wars, and the Eight-Nation Alliance intervention. Figure 2 maps the provinces each episode touched, and Table A4 lists the dates and provincial assignments. Internal conflict reached the Yangzi valley, the north China plain, the southwest, and the northwest; external wars reached the coast, the capital region, and the Vietnamese border. Internal denotes domestically organized conflict or mobilization; external denotes an organized foreign intervention. The distinction is organizational. For brevity, the text calls internal episodes rebellions and external episodes foreign wars.

The Boxer movement is the important borderline case. Its anti-Christian and anti-foreign mobilization developed domestically, but parts of the Qing state later supported it and fought foreign forces. The imperial annals record both suppression and recruitment of Boxers in 1900 (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 24, Guangxu 26). It differs from an anti-dynastic rebellion such as the Taiping. I retain it as an internal episode. In the stacked comparison the Boxer stack keeps only Shanxi, because

³Both transcriptions record Qian's printed mark, which distinguishes the Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun Banners and the imperial lineage. The cross-source check in Appendix Table A3 covers every commissioner of 1849–1865 found in the CGED-Q rosters. The executive marks and the commissioners of other years are not cross-checked, so the comparison assumes that classification errors among them do not change systematically with exposure.

A. Internal conflicts



B. External wars




Figure 2. Where the internal conflicts and external wars occurred

Notes: Benchmark provincial assignments of Table A4; letters identify episodes, shading counts the episodes of each type that touched a province, not their intensity. Dates are the common onsets of Table A4; the main comparison dates the Taiping war by its arrival in each province (Table A5) and the Nian phase to 1853. Sichuan, hatched, has no assignment; a sensitivity analysis adds its Li-Lan (1859) and Taiping (1862) onsets. Taiwan was a prefecture of Fujian until 1885. Boundaries are modern provincial boundaries aggregated to approximate the eighteen Qing provinces (Zhili includes Beijing and Tianjin; Gansu includes Ningxia; Sichuan includes Chongqing; Guangdong includes Hainan).

Zhili and Shandong had another war's onset or early years inside its window, and the two-way comparison of Appendix B.2 separately removes the Boxer–Alliance years.

Two chronologies are used. The main comparison dates the Taiping war by its documented arrival in each province: Guangxi in 1851, Hunan and Hubei in 1852, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, and the northern-expedition provinces in 1853, Shandong in 1854, and Zhejiang in 1858 (Table A5). Because the Nian overlapped the Taiping in Anhui, Henan, Shandong, and Jiangsu, the Nian phase is dated to 1853, when Yuan Jiasan's biography records a consolidation of Nian bands and a dedicated suppression assignment (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 418); Shandong, which the Taiping reached in 1854, therefore enters the 1853 stack through the Nian. The second chronology applies a common onset to each episode in all its assigned provinces (Table A4). The difference is consequential: the common Taiping onset is 1851, but Taiping forces entered Zhejiang in 1858 and Hangzhou in 1860 (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406, 475), so a common onset counts years in which the war had not yet reached a province as exposed. Both chronologies are reported; the dated Nian alternative of 1855 and the remaining timing variants are in Table B4 for the stacked comparison and Table B8 for the two-way comparison.

The register is a selected set of ten conflicts, and Sichuan tests what the selection leaves out. Sichuan has no exposure in the benchmark ten-episode assignment, yet the Li–Lan uprising entered Sichuan in 1859 and Shi Dakai's army entered in 1862 (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406, 425). In the stacked comparison Sichuan is a control in several stacks, and Section 4.7 reports the estimates without it; the two-way comparison also adds its conflicts to the register. Liu Rong's Sichuan appointment in Section 5 is situated within those local events.

Appendix A sets out the remaining coding choices for each episode. Figure 3 shows the Banner shares of the three offices over the whole period. The executive Banner share fell through the 1840s, to 27.3 percent in 1849, then rose from 30.0 percent in 1852 to 52.0 percent in 1856 as the Taiping war spread, and collapsed after 1861 as the commanders of the regional armies took over the governorships and some governor-generalships. Within it, the governor-general share rose from 26.7 percent in 1852 to 56.7 percent in 1856, and the governor share from 5.0 percent in 1849 to 50.0 percent in 1855–1858. The fiscal share rose from 21.0 percent in 1853 to 48.9 percent in 1857 and fell after 1861. The judicial share also rose in the mid-1850s, to 39.4 percent in 1855, and fell to 9.3 percent in 1862. The executive share stayed below 15 percent from 1864 to 1884 and then recovered, to 32.0 percent in 1900 and 49.1 percent in 1908, when the governor-general share was 70.0 percent. The fall after 1861 and the later recovery each admit two readings. The fall fits a pool of Bannermen with war records too small for the posts the war had created, and equally a court that preferred the Han commanders who had won it; the recovery fits a pool that refilled over decades, and equally a court whose preferences changed again, as it concentrated central offices among

Manchus in its last years (Rhoads, 2000). The comparisons below concern the first years after each onset and do not separate these readings. They ask how much of these movements followed the onset of a war in a province, relative to provinces where no war began in the same years or shortly before.




Figure 3. Banner shares of the three offices, 1825–1911

Notes: Equal-province means of the recorded Banner share; centered five-year moving averages require at least three annual values. The shaded interval is 1851–1864. All 1,566 province-years. Commissioners whom Qian marks with a question mark are counted as Bannermen (Section 3). The annual values quoted in the text are unsmoothed.

3.3 A stacked comparison of exposed and comparison provinces

Exposure is staggered and repeated: many provinces met more than one war, and several wars overlapped. A regression that pools all province-years with province and year effects then compares newly exposed provinces with provinces already exposed to another war, which biases the estimates when responses differ across episodes (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020). I therefore compare each episode only with provinces that had no recent war onset or early war exposure, and stack the comparisons (Cengiz et al., 2019; Wing et al., 2024).

For each onset year s of each war type, a stack contains years $s - 4$ to $s + 3$. Treated (exposed) provinces are those whose episode begins in s . Comparison provinces, the controls, are those with no episode onset and no first-three-year exposure to any episode inside the stack window. A treated province with another episode’s onset or early window inside its own window is left out, so that each estimate compares one war with provinces that had no war onset or early war exposure in

the window; this removes Zhili from the 1853 Taiping and the Second Opium War stacks, Zhili and Shandong from the Boxer stack, and the Eight-Nation Alliance stack entirely. Two indicators absorb later-window exposure (years 4–10) to other episodes, and the onset year is dropped for treated provinces. Comparison provinces are therefore not all untouched by war: some are in the later years of an earlier war, and the comparison assumes that the two indicators capture the lasting effects of earlier wars on their Banner shares; they absorb an average effect, not every lasting or uneven one (Section 4.7). The main comparison has eleven stacks, with 45 internal and 30 external treated province-years after onset in each office (Table B1). The estimating equation is

$$B_{spjt}^{\text{rec}} = \alpha_{spj} + \lambda_{sjt} + \beta_{jI} T_{sp} \mathbf{1}\{s \in I\} \text{Post}_{st} + \beta_{jE} T_{sp} \mathbf{1}\{s \in E\} \text{Post}_{st} + \gamma_j' L_{pt} + u_{spjt}, \quad (4)$$

where s indexes stacks, T_{sp} marks treated provinces, Post_{st} marks years one to three after onset, and L_{pt} holds the two later-window indicators. Stack-by-province-by-office effects compare each post with its own level before onset, and stack-by-year-by-office effects compare it with the same office in the stack's control provinces in the same year. Each cell receives equal weight. The estimand is the change in exposed provinces relative to comparison provinces of the same stack. Because officials came from one empire-wide pool, a war can also change the comparison provinces, by drawing officials away from them, and the estimate then includes that change (Section 4.4); it is neither the effect of a war on a province in isolation nor a change in the empire-wide Banner share. The pooled coefficient averages the stacks with weights that depend on each stack's numbers of exposed and comparison provinces; Appendix Table B5 reports each stack's estimate and weight, and Section 4.7 an estimate that weights each stack by its number of exposed provinces (Wing et al., 2024). Because every effect and every coefficient is specific to the office, the estimates of β_{jI} and β_{jE} are identical to those from a separate regression for each office; estimating the offices together supplies the covariance needed to test restrictions across offices.

For each office the early type contrast is

$$\Delta_j = \beta_{jE} - \beta_{jI}. \quad (5)$$

The main joint test is $\Delta_G = \Delta_F = \Delta_J$, with two restrictions and the covariance across offices. It tests equality between responses, not whether every response separately differs from zero. The fiscal–judicial comparison of Section 2.4 uses $\theta_c = \beta_{Fc} - \beta_{Jc}$, estimated on stack-province-years with both commissions observed, and the equal-office mean

$$B_{pt}^{\text{civil}} = \frac{B_{pGt}^{\text{rec}} + B_{pFt}^{\text{rec}} + B_{pJt}^{\text{rec}}}{3} \quad (6)$$

asks how much overall representation moved. Adding stack-by-province-by-year effects, which are common to the offices of a province in a year, compares offices within the same province and year. Because the panel is balanced, with all three offices observed in every stack-province-year, the differences between offices estimated this way equal the differences between the separate estimates; only their standard errors change.

Identification of β_{jc} requires that, without the war, Banner representation in an exposed province's office would have moved like the same office in the stack's control provinces. Event-time versions of Equation (4), which replace Post_{st} by single years, show whether exposed and control provinces moved together before onset; parallel paths before onset make the assumption more plausible but cannot establish it. The years-since-onset rule combines different phases: one of the 45 internal post-onset province-years and ten of the 30 external ones fall after the registered end of their episode.

3.4 Inference and personnel follow-up

Exposure is assigned to provinces: when an episode reaches a province, all three of its offices enter the window together and stay in it for several years. Appointments within a province are also linked across years and offices, through the same governor's recommendations, the same local conditions, and promotions from one commission to the other. The errors are therefore correlated within a province, and the number of independent units behind the estimates is closer to eighteen provinces than to the 2,973 stacked office cells; treating the cells as independent would overstate precision. I therefore cluster standard errors by province, which also allows for a province appearing in several stacks. Provinces under one governor-general are not independent either: his appointment enters the executive share of each of them, and he assessed and recommended the governors and commissioners under him. I therefore also cluster by governor-general jurisdiction, with eleven clusters: the eight jurisdictions, and Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan, which had a governor and no governor-general. Jurisdiction clustering was added after the province-clustered estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B). Both are reported for the main estimates (Tables 2, 3, and 5, and Appendix Table B4), and conclusions rest on the larger of the two p -values. For the executive estimates that is usually the jurisdiction-clustered value; for some commission estimates the jurisdiction clusters give the smaller p -values. Several robustness tables report province clusters only. With so few clusters, conventional cluster-robust tests reject a true null too often (Cameron et al., 2008; Cameron and Miller, 2015), so the main tests use null-imposed wild-cluster bootstrap p -values with Rademacher weights, enumerating all 2^{G-1} sign vectors: 131,072 with province clusters and 1,024 with jurisdiction clusters (Appendix B). The smallest attainable p -value is then

$1/2^{G-1}$, which is $1/128$ for the governor-general series alone, observed in eight jurisdictions. Clustering by calendar year as well as by province, which allows for correlation across provinces exposed to the same war in the same year, gives a conventional clustered p -value of 0.0588 for the joint test, against 0.0440 with province clustering alone (the wild p -value with province clusters is 0.059).

The joint test that the external-minus-internal contrast is equal across the three offices is the primary test of the hypothesis in Section 2.4; the executive’s external-minus-internal contrast, one of the three single-office contrasts, is the headline estimate of whether the two kinds of threat moved the executive differently (Holm-adjusted wild $p = 0.0062$ with province clusters and 0.012 with jurisdiction clusters); the executive’s internal coefficient, which Section 4 reports first, is the clearest single estimate; the finance–justice comparison estimates the ordering stated in Section 2.4, which was formulated after a first look at the office pattern, and the event-time estimates show the pre-war paths. A test that the executive’s response to rebellion equals the mean response of the two commissions, which tests whether the rise was concentrated in the executive, was added after the main estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B).⁴ Appendix B records the analysis sequence and full inference.

The personnel follow-up uses 1,547 senior person–edition records in twenty-seven source edition codes during 1850–1864. A season-unknown 1860 edition is excluded from chronological comparisons. Exact-name, stable-attribute links distinguish continued presence from unmatched appearance in each office category; supplied person identifiers support the fixed cohort and a linkage sensitivity (Campbell and Chen, 2022). All displayed roster totals are generated from these person–edition and link records. Appendix C sets out the date, vacancy, and denominator rules.

4 Rebellion, Foreign War, and Where the Court Placed Its Banners

4.1 The main comparison

Figure 4 shows the timing of the main estimates. It plots the Banner share of each office in exposed provinces relative to comparison provinces, year by year, from four years before a war’s onset to three years after. Before a rebellion’s onset the executive coefficients lie between -9.8 and -8.5 points relative to year -1 and are jointly indistinguishable from zero (wild $p = 0.85$; Appendix Table B2). In the first year after onset the executive share rose by 47.8 points, and by 48.1 in the

⁴Holm adjustment applies separately to the three single-office type contrasts (Table 2) and to the two-commission mean and the fiscal–judicial gap (Table 5). Lead tests and alternative specifications are reported unadjusted.

second. The commissions moved less, and less precisely: the fiscal coefficients are +14.7 and +18.9 points in the first two years and the judicial coefficients −31.1 and −27.8. Their pre-onset coefficients are also jointly insignificant (wild $p = 0.35$ and 0.91). After a foreign war's onset the executive coefficients are negative and less precisely estimated. Equal pre-onset coefficients are reassuring but cannot rule out differential trends that the data do not show.

Table 2 pools years one to three. In the three years after a rebellion's onset, the Banner share of the provincial executive rose by 48.6 percentage points relative to comparison provinces. With clusters by governor-general jurisdiction the standard error is 16.0 and the wild p -value 0.0078; with province clusters they are 13.5 and 0.0004. The fiscal share rose by 18.5 points (wild $p = 0.128$ with province clusters and 0.122 with jurisdiction clusters) and the judicial share fell by 19.9 ($p = 0.138$ and 0.033; the jurisdiction-clustered standard error, 5.2, is much smaller than the province-clustered one, 13.6). Relative to the judicial share, the executive share rose by 68.6 points, the difference between the two estimates in Table 2, and a test that the three offices responded alike to rebellion, which the hypothesis does not state, has wild $p = 0.0091$ with province clusters and 0.021 with jurisdiction clusters (Table 2). The executive's response also exceeded the mean response of the two commissions, by 49 points (wild $p = 0.0038$ with province clusters and 0.031 with jurisdiction clusters); this comparison, which tests whether the rise was concentrated in the executive, was added after the main estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B). Before onset the same difference shows no detectable movement: its three pre-onset coefficients are jointly insignificant (wild $p = 0.913$ with province clusters and 0.921 with jurisdiction clusters). It rests largely on the 1853 comparison: without it the difference is +20.7 points ($p = 0.107$ and 0.123), with common onsets +10.3 ($p = 0.393$ and 0.365), and with the question-mark officials coded as non-Banner +52.0 ($p = 0.0033$ and 0.031). Whether the gap differed between the two kinds of threat is not established: its external-minus-internal contrast is −56.5 points ($p = 0.041$ and 0.113). For the commissions the jurisdiction-clustered standard errors are in some cases much smaller than the province-clustered ones; with eleven clusters this more likely reflects an imprecise variance estimate than greater precision, so conclusions about the commissions rest on the larger of the two p -values.

After a foreign war began the estimates are −17.9 points in executive office, −17.0 in finance, and −4.5 in justice, none separately significant. The external-minus-internal contrast is −66.6 points for executive office (wild $p = 0.0021$ with province clusters and 0.0039 with jurisdiction clusters), −35.5 for finance ($p = 0.045$ and 0.061), and +15.4 for justice ($p = 0.434$ and 0.429). Whether this contrast differs across the three offices is less certain: the joint test gives wild $p = 0.059$ with province clusters and 0.188 with jurisdiction clusters. The executive response to rebellion, and its difference from the response to foreign war, hold under both clusterings; the full three-office




Figure 4. Banner representation before and after the onset of a war

Notes: Coefficients on treated-by-event-time indicators from the stacked comparison, relative to year -1 ; the onset year is omitted. Internal conflict uses province-specific Taiping arrival dates. The shaded band marks years 1–3. Intervals are pointwise 95 percent province-clustered CR1 intervals using the t_{17} critical value. Coefficients and joint lead tests are in Table B2.

pattern of Section 2.4, which the primary test of the hypothesis examines, is not established under either clustering.

Table 2. Banner representation in the three years after a rebellion or a foreign war

Office	Internal years 1–3	External years 1–3	External minus internal	Wild p : province / jurisdiction	
				Internal	External minus internal
<i>A. Main comparison: Taiping dated by provincial arrival; question-mark officials counted as Bannermen</i>					
Executive	+48.65 (13.49)	−17.92 (14.60)	−66.56 (16.66)	0.0004 / 0.0078	0.0021 / 0.0039
Fiscal commissioner	+18.52 (11.69)	−17.00 (14.36)	−35.51 (17.23)	0.1284 / 0.1221	0.0451 / 0.0605
Judicial commissioner	−19.92 (13.57)	−4.51 (13.93)	+15.41 (20.89)	0.1381 / 0.0332	0.4337 / 0.4287
Equal contrasts, joint test					0.0587 / 0.1875
Equal internal, joint test ^a				0.0091 / 0.0205	
Executive minus commissions ^b	+49.35 (16.53)	−7.16 (19.25)	−56.51 (24.01)	0.0038 / 0.0312	0.0410 / 0.1133
<i>B. Question-mark officials counted as non-Banner</i>					
Executive	+48.65 (13.49)	−17.92 (14.60)	−66.56 (16.66)	0.0004 / 0.0078	0.0021 / 0.0039
Fiscal commissioner	+23.47 (11.91)	−20.18 (13.36)	−43.65 (18.01)	0.0718 / 0.0195	0.0313 / 0.0059
Judicial commissioner	−30.23 (8.85)	+5.94 (7.34)	+36.17 (9.49)	0.0007 / 0.0088	0.0019 / 0.0010
Equal contrasts, joint test					0.0002 / 0.0088
Executive minus commissions ^b	+52.03 (17.13)	−10.80 (19.13)	−62.82 (23.36)	0.0033 / 0.0312	0.0252 / 0.0430
<i>C. Common episode onsets</i>					
Executive	+17.85 (8.22)	−18.09 (14.54)	−35.94 (16.81)	0.0597 / 0.0801	0.0574 / 0.0361
Fiscal commissioner	+23.12 (13.22)	−17.14 (14.18)	−40.25 (22.82)	0.0808 / 0.1553	0.0957 / 0.1182
Judicial commissioner	−7.92 (7.75)	−4.25 (13.88)	+3.67 (16.23)	0.2601 / 0.1045	0.8092 / 0.8203
Equal contrasts, joint test					0.2472 / 0.4463
Executive minus commissions ^b	+10.26 (12.70)	−7.40 (19.12)	−17.65 (23.93)	0.3932 / 0.3652	0.4487 / 0.4824

Notes: Executive: governors-general and governors together, a governor-general counted in each province of his jurisdiction. Recorded Banner percentage points; province-clustered CR1 standard errors in parentheses. Each episode onset forms a stack of years –4 to +3; treated provinces are compared with provinces that have no episode onset or first-three-year exposure inside the stack window (Section 3.3, Table B1). Stack-by-province-by-office and stack-by-year-by-office effects; two indicators absorb later-window (years 4–10) exposure to other episodes. Wild p -values enumerate all Rademacher sign vectors under the null, with eighteen province clusters (first value) and eleven governor-general-jurisdiction clusters (second value; the eight jurisdictions and Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan). Jurisdiction-clustered standard errors of the Panel A internal coefficients are 15.98, 9.36, and 5.16. Holm-adjusted p -values of the three Panel A contrasts with province clusters: 0.0062, 0.0903, 0.4337; with jurisdiction clusters: 0.0117, 0.1211, 0.4287. Panels A and B have 75 and Panel C 78 treated post-onset province-years per office; the joint tests use 2,973 (Panels A, B) and 2,634 (Panel C) stacked office cells. Panel B changes only the commission series; Qian defines the question mark as a banner affiliation to be verified but broadly attributable to the Banners (Section 3.1). ^aTest that the three internal coefficients are equal, from the same regression; it is not the test stated in Section 2.4, which concerns the external-minus-internal contrasts. ^bThe executive coefficient minus the mean of the two commission coefficients, $\beta_G - (\beta_F + \beta_J)/2$, estimated as one outcome on the same stack-province-years; added after the main estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B). In Panel A without the 1853 internal stack the internal difference is +20.7 (wild $p = 0.107 / 0.123$), and in the event-time version its three internal pre-onset coefficients are jointly insignificant (wild $p = 0.913 / 0.921$).

Panel B codes the commissioners whom Qian marks with a question mark as non-Banner. The executive estimates do not change. The commission estimates become larger and more precise: the judicial share falls by 30.2 points (wild $p = 0.0007$ with province clusters, 0.0088 with jurisdiction

clusters), and the joint test gives $p = 0.0002$ and 0.0088 . Panel C dates the Taiping war by a common 1851 onset instead of its arrival in each province. The executive estimate is +17.9 points, smaller because years before the war reached a province count as exposed, and the contrasts are -35.9 , -40.3 , and $+3.7$ points (joint wild $p = 0.247$ and 0.446).

The magnitudes are large because the posts are few. A province had at most one governor-general and one governor at a time, and one fiscal and one judicial commissioner (Jiangsu had two fiscal commissioners, at Suzhou and Jiangning), with further names only in years of succession. Each annual cell therefore records only a few names (Appendix Table A1), and a single appointment can change a cell's share by a large amount. The estimates do not come from a change in how many names were recorded in a year: conditioning on the number of names leaves them essentially unchanged (Table 6).

4.2 Governors-general and governors

The executive share combines two posts with different reach (Section 2.3): the governor-general's command covered the troops of one to three provinces, the governor's one. Table 3 splits the executive share into the two posts; the split was made after the main estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B). Provinces without a governor (Zhili, Sichuan, and Gansu, and late in the period Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong, and Yunnan) contribute only to the governor-general series, and provinces without a governor-general (Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan) only to the governor series.

The estimate is larger for the governor-generalship: 56.8 points (SE 14.6; wild $p = 0.0008$ with province clusters and 0.023 with the eight governor-general jurisdictions), against 17.5 for the governorship (SE 15.4; $p = 0.387$ and 0.414). The difference, 39.2 points (SE 18.4), has wild $p = 0.040$ with province clusters and 0.150 with jurisdiction clusters, so the evidence that the regional command responded more than the governorship is suggestive rather than firm. Two further checks point in opposite directions. Dropping comparison provinces that share a governor-general with an exposed province, which otherwise appears on both sides of the comparison, raises the governor-general estimate to +60.5 points ($p = 0.023$ with jurisdiction clusters). Counting each governor-generalship once per year, rather than once for each province it governed, lowers it to +42.6 points (SE 25.2; $p = 0.125$ with eight clusters; Panel C). Appendix B.3 (Figure B3) shows the governor-general and governor series by year.

The governorships moved differently from one episode to the next. In the 1853 stack, which carries the most weight, the Banner share of exposed governorships rose from 20 to 69 percent while the comparison governorships stayed at 0; in the 1851, 1852, and 1858 stacks the comparison

Table 3. Governors-general and governors

	Internal years 1–3	Wild p province / jurisdiction	External years 1–3	External minus internal
<i>A. The four posts in one stacked regression</i>				
Governor-general	+56.8 (14.6)	0.0008 / 0.0234	–19.9 (15.3)	–76.7 (17.8)
Governor	+17.5 (15.4)	0.3873 / 0.4141	–9.1 (20.2)	–26.7 (26.3)
Fiscal commissioner	+18.5 (11.8)	0.1284 / 0.1221	–17.0 (14.4)	–35.5 (17.3)
Judicial commissioner	–19.9 (13.6)	0.1381 / 0.0332	–4.5 (14.0)	+15.4 (21.0)
Governor-general minus governor	+39.2 (18.4)	0.0405 / 0.1504		–50.0 (28.1)
Internal coefficients equal across the four offices		0.0236 / 0.0107		
Ordered contrast of the internal coefficients		0.0022 / 0.0293		
External-minus-internal contrasts equal across the four				0.0647 / 0.0830
<i>B. Comparison provinces that share a governor-general with an exposed province dropped</i>				
Governor-general	+60.5 (14.1)	0.0010 / 0.0234	–16.8 (16.3)	–77.2 (16.0)
Governors-general and governors	+53.6 (12.9)	0.0001 / 0.0059	–18.7 (14.6)	–72.3 (14.4)
Governor	+28.7 (11.0)	0.0307 / 0.0664	–16.0 (20.0)	–44.7 (20.4)
<i>C. Governor-general posts, each jurisdiction counted once</i>				
Governor-general	+42.6 (25.2)	0.1250	–4.6 (22.5)	–47.2 (24.8)

Notes: Recorded Banner percentage points; province-clustered CR1 standard errors in parentheses. Panel A is the main stacked comparison with the executive share split into the governor-generalship and the governorship, estimated jointly with the two commissions (stack-by-province-by-office and stack-by-year-by-office effects). A governor-general is counted in each province of his jurisdiction; provinces without a governor (Zhili, Sichuan, Gansu, and, late in the period, Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong, and Yunnan) or without a governor-general (Shandong, Shanxi, Henan) drop out of the corresponding office. Wild p -values enumerate all Rademacher sign vectors, with clusters by province or by governor-general jurisdiction (eleven: eight jurisdictions and Shandong, Shanxi, Henan); the governor-general series alone has eight jurisdiction clusters, so its smallest attainable p -value is 1/128. The ordered contrast weights the internal coefficients of the governor-general, governor, fiscal, and judicial offices 1.5, 0.5, –0.5, –1.5; this ordering was formulated after the split was estimated and is also the order of rank. Panel B estimates each series separately and drops a comparison province from a stack when another province of its governor-general jurisdiction is exposed, or in the first three years of another war, inside the stack window; without the drop these separate regressions give +56.8; +48.6; +17.5. The governor-general-minus-governor row tests the equality of the two internal coefficients (and, in the last column, of the two external-minus-internal contrasts). Restricted to cells with both posts and with stack-by-province-by-year effects, the difference is 37.4 (wild $p = 0.0059$ with twelve province clusters, 0.031 with six jurisdiction clusters, the smallest attainable with six; clustered $p = 0.128$ and 0.160); the wild bootstrap is unreliable with so few clusters, and the text does not rely on this test. Standard errors in Panel A differ slightly from those in Table 2 for the same coefficients because the CR1 small-sample factor depends on the numbers of observations and fixed effects in the four-office regression. Panel C uses one observation per governor-generalship and year, with the post exposed in a stack when at least one of its provinces is exposed in that stack and each of the others is exposed or a comparison province, as a comparison post when all its provinces are comparison provinces, and left out of the stack otherwise; standard errors and wild p clustered by jurisdiction (eight).

governorships moved toward Bannermen about as much as the exposed ones or more. The governor-generalships of the Taiping provinces, by contrast, went from 13 percent Banner in 1852 to 75 percent in 1855, while those of the other seven provinces fell from 43 to 21 percent between 1852 and 1854.

4.3 Appointments, departures, and turnover

The governor and governor-general tables date every appointment and departure (Appendix A.3), so the stacked comparison can also be run on these decisions, with a governorship or governor-generalship as the unit (Appendix B.3, Table B11). These margins, the convention of counting the onset year, and the failure-exit comparison were added after the main estimates had been seen (analysis sequence, Appendix B). Posts the war reached changed hands more often: 0.70 appointments per post and year from onset, against about 0.5 before onset and in comparison posts, an estimated +0.25 (wild $p = 0.037$ with jurisdiction clusters, as for all estimates in this subsection); most of the difference is in the onset year itself, and counting only years one to three it is +0.10 (wild $p = 0.301$). Appointees to exposed governor-generalships were more often Bannermen than appointees to comparison posts, by 71 points on thirteen appointments ($p = 0.062$), and by a similar 64 points on the nine made in years one to three ($p = 0.375$); appointees to governorships were not. The gap between Banner and other incumbents' departure rates did not change significantly with onset (+22.8 points, SE 22.0). Nor were Banner incumbents of exposed posts less likely than others to leave them through dismissal, demotion, or death in battle or by suicide during the fighting: such exits ended 20 percent of Banner and 22 percent of other incumbent-years in exposed posts from onset, and the tenures of 11 of the 22 Bannermen and 17 of the 46 others who held those posts. The stacked estimates of the Banner-minus-other difference are imprecise and depend on how the year effects are specified (Appendix B.3), so these comparisons detect no protective difference for Bannermen, but they cannot rule one out. At Huguang, after the Han governor-general Wu Wenrong died in the fighting in early 1854, the court dismissed his Banner successor Taiyong in July, four months after appointing him, and Yang Pei in June 1855, and each time gave the post to another Bannerman; the Banner governor of Hubei, Qinglin, who fled Wuchang in 1854, was put to death. Three of the six Bannermen appointed to exposed governor-generalships came from the Banner garrison generalships: Yiliang from Fuzhou to Liangjiang in 1853, and Taiyong and Guanwen from Jingzhou to Huguang in 1854 and 1855 (Qian, 1980). The court used the same route for comparison posts, Yurui from Chengdu to Sichuan in 1853 and Lebin from Chengdu to Shaan-Gan in 1856; what differed in the exposed jurisdictions was how often the post went to a Bannerman. These estimates rest on few appointments, so they describe how the shares changed rather than add an independent test.

Garrison generals commanded troops, so these appointments do not by themselves separate reliability from military experience, and the comparison with foreign wars does not separate them either. By the wars with France and Japan the officials with records in the field were mostly the Han commanders of the rebellion years, so an account based on experience also predicts the Han

appointees seen there (Section 5). The First Opium War, fought before the commanders of the regional armies rose, is less affected by that later change and adds a supplementary clue: there the executive estimate is +7.0 points, against the pooled rebellion estimate of +48.6 (Appendix Table B5, where the single rebellion stacks range from -16.6 to $+108.1$). It does not separate the two accounts. Experience against rebels and experience against a foreign force may have been valued differently, the two kinds of war called for different military skills, and the candidates of the 1830s differed from those of the 1850s; Bannermen already held four of the seven theater executive posts when that war began, and after the fighting began the court moved Bannermen into the other two governor-generalships (Section 5). The estimate is one comparison of four provinces, without a standard error of its own, and it counts Jiangsu as exposed from 1839, although the fighting reached Jiangsu only in 1842. The chronologies do not record prior command for every candidate, so the evidence is consistent with a premium on reliability but does not exclude a premium on military experience, in particular experience against rebels.

4.4 Where the executive estimate comes from

The coefficient of 49 points is a comparison with other provinces, not the change in the exposed provinces' own Banner share. Table 4 shows the raw means. Averaged over the rebellion stacks, the executive Banner share in exposed provinces rose from 25.3 percent in the four years before onset to 53.4 percent in the three years after, while in comparison provinces it fell from 38.6 to 27.6 percent. The 1853 stack, which contains the six provinces that the Taiping armies or the Nian reached that year, carries the largest weight: there the exposed provinces' share rose from 17.7 to 74.1 percent and the comparison provinces' share fell from 57.9 to 8.0 percent.

Part of the estimate therefore reflects Bannermen leaving the comparison provinces. In the 1853 comparison that fall comes mostly from Shaan-Gan and Sichuan, whose Banner governors-general were succeeded by Han officials. In June 1853 Shuxing'a was sent from Shaan-Gan on an assignment that the chronology does not specify; he was dismissed in January 1854, and Yi Tang held the post until 1856. In Sichuan, Yurui was removed in November 1854 and Huang Zonghan succeeded him (Qian, 1980). The sources used here give no cause for either change, so the data cannot say whether the war produced them. Min-Zhe's Banner governor-general Huicheng, appointed in September 1853 while he commanded troops against the Taiping in northern Jiangsu, was dismissed over the fighting at Yangzhou in the twelfth month of the Qing year that began in February 1853, which fell in January 1854 (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 20). The panel counts years as Qian's table years, which are Qing years (Appendix A), so his whole tenure lies in the 1853 table year, the onset year of the stack, which does not enter the estimate. Shuxing'a's dismissal is likewise

Table 4. Where the executive estimate comes from: raw executive Banner shares*A. Executive Banner share (percent), four years before and three years after a rebellion's onset*

	Before	After	Change
<i>All rebellion stacks</i>			
Exposed provinces (14)	25.3	53.4	+28.1
Comparison provinces (17)	38.6	27.6	−11.0
<i>1853 stack</i>			
Exposed provinces (6)	17.7	74.1	+56.4
Comparison provinces (5)	57.9	8.0	−49.9

B. Banner executive appearances per year

Year	1849	1850	1851	1852	1853	1854	1855
Eleven Taiping provinces	5	5	4	5	12	16	13
Other seven provinces	6	4	9	6	7	6	5

Notes: Panel A averages the stack-province-years of the main comparison; numbers of provinces in parentheses (a province can appear in several stacks). The 1853 stack contains the six provinces the Taiping armies or the Nian reached in 1853 (Table B1). Panel B counts recorded Banner names among governors and governors-general, counting a governor-general once for each province he governed; the eleven Taiping provinces are those of Table A5.

dated in the 1853 table year, but his replacement by Yi Tang shows in the comparison provinces from 1854. The court drew on one empire-wide pool of officials, so a reallocation of this kind is part of what the paper studies, but it means the estimate is a relative allocation (Section 3.3). The total also rose: counting a governor-general once for each province he governed, Bannermen held 4 to 5 executive appearances a year in the eleven Taiping provinces in 1849–1852 and 12 to 16 in 1853–1855, while in the other seven provinces they held 4 to 9 throughout. Dropping the 1853 stack lowers the executive estimate to +24.9 points (wild $p = 0.025$ with province clusters and 0.056 with jurisdiction clusters); dropping the four Taiping and Nian stacks gives +31.7 ($p = 0.045$ and 0.027); and dropping all 1850s rebellion stacks, which leaves three provinces on the internal side, gives +25.9 ($p = 0.257$ and 0.189). Removing any single stack or province leaves the estimate between +24.9 and +55.4 points. With province clusters every such estimate has wild p below 0.03; with jurisdiction clusters two do not, the estimates without the 1853 stack ($p = 0.056$) and without Sichuan ($p = 0.059$), and the rest have p below 0.03 (Appendix Table B4). Dating the Nian from 1855 or leaving it out, dating the Taiping arrival in Zhejiang to 1860, or dropping the appointments that Qian marks as not taken up or not yet arrived gives estimates between +50.2 and +54.0 points, with jurisdiction-clustered p of at most 0.0098. The sign of the estimate does not depend on the 1853 comparison; with jurisdiction clusters its precision falls without it.

4.5 Pre-war paths and the pooled regression

For foreign war the pre-onset coefficients are also jointly insignificant (wild p between 0.20 and 0.67), but the executive coefficients rise toward year -1 , so the foreign-war estimates rest on a less settled baseline. The main comparison also dates each foreign war by its common onset, while the Taiping war is dated by arrival, so a province can count as exposed to a foreign war before the fighting reached it, as Jiangsu did before 1842; and ten of the thirty foreign-war province-years after onset fall after the war had ended. Section 4.7 dates each foreign war by the first fighting in each province it reached and ends its window with the war; neither changes the executive contrast much. The rebellion half is the better identified half of the comparison.

A pooled two-way fixed-effects regression with a common 1851 onset (Appendix B.2) gives executive pre-onset coefficients for rebellion between -15.9 and -5.0 points, all negative, with a joint wild p -value of 0.190. The stacked design points to timing as the source. With common onsets the stacked executive pre-onset coefficients differ jointly from zero (wild $p = 0.027$ with province clusters), and with provincial arrival dates they do not ($p = 0.85$): the movement appears to come from counting provinces that the Taiping armies had not yet reached as exposed, although the two versions also differ in their stacks and comparison provinces.

4.6 Finance and justice

The two commissions were adjacent rungs of one career ladder, and only the fiscal commission controlled funds. Table 5 separates how many Bannermen served in them from where they served. The mean Banner share of the two commissions has an external-minus-internal contrast of -10.1 points (wild $p = 0.323$ with province clusters and 0.479 with jurisdiction clusters). The mean of all three offices, Equation (6), has a contrast of -28.9 points (wild $p = 0.0001$ and 0.0020); it moves mostly because the executive share does, which contributes -22.2 of these points. The fiscal-minus-judicial gap rose by 38.4 points under rebellion and fell by 12.5 under foreign war; the difference is -50.9 points (SE 31.8; wild $p = 0.116$ with province clusters and 0.084 with jurisdiction clusters). The sign is that of the ordering in Equation (2), which was formulated after a first look at the office pattern, and the difference is not precisely estimated; with Han Chun counted as a Bannerman (Section 4.7) it is -40.6 points (wild $p = 0.219$). With the question-mark officials coded as non-Banner, the difference is -79.8 points (wild $p = 0.0017$ with province clusters and 0.0039 with jurisdiction clusters). The fiscal commission also ranked higher than the judicial, so faster promotion of Bannermen up the ladder during a rebellion would produce the same gap; the gap does not separate control over funds from rank.

Table 5. How many and where: means and the fiscal–judicial gap

Outcome	Internal	External	External minus internal	Wild p
Three-office mean	+15.75 (4.86)	−13.14 (5.79)	−28.89 (6.32)	0.0001
Two-commission mean $(F + J)/2$	−0.70 (5.97)	−10.75 (8.20)	−10.05 (10.65)	0.3235
Fiscal minus judicial $F - J$	+38.44 (22.33)	−12.48 (23.06)	−50.92 (31.82)	0.1157

Notes: Stacked comparisons with province-specific Taiping arrival dates on the 991 stack-province-years with all three offices observed; stack-by-province and stack-by-year effects, later-window indicators, eighteen province clusters. Recorded Banner percentage points; CR1 standard errors in parentheses. The internal and external components of the gap are $\hat{\theta}_I$ and $\hat{\theta}_E$ of Equation (2); their wild p -values are 0.0980 and 0.5789. Holm-adjusted p -values for the two-commission mean and the gap are 0.3235 and 0.2314. With clusters by governor-general jurisdiction the wild p -values of the three contrasts are 0.0020, 0.4785, and 0.0840.

4.7 Robustness and limits

Table 6 collects the main alternatives. The executive contrast is negative in all of them, between −23.1 and −77.6 points; it is smallest with common onsets and in the two-way regression, which count years before the war reached a province as exposed, and when the 1850s rebellions are dropped. The joint test is more fragile: it has wild $p = 0.188$ with jurisdiction clusters; removing one stack or province at a time gives joint wild p -values between 0.014 and 0.215 with province clusters, the largest when the 1853 stack is removed (Table B3); and clustering by calendar year as well as by province gives a conventional clustered p -value of 0.059, against 0.044 with province clustering alone. A randomization test that reassigns which provinces of each rebellion stack are exposed, holding their number fixed, gives a two-sided p -value of 0.0014 for the executive estimate (5,000 draws; this test drops the onset year for all provinces, which gives an estimate of +50.0 points). Banner marks coded exactly as printed in each year, instead of harmonized for each person, give nearly the same estimates. The main coding gives each official one identity, the one Qian prints for him anywhere in his governor, governor-general, and commission tables, as the executive series does, apart from the five unmarked years of three question-mark officials (Section 3). Harmonizing the commission marks within the commission tables only would code as non-Banner four officials whom Qian marks as Bannermen in the governor table (Bogui, Chengxun, Zhao Erxun, and Bian Baoquan); the internal fiscal estimate would then be +15.4 points and the contrasts −66.6, −33.7, and +16.0 points, with joint wild $p = 0.055$. One further official, Han Chun, whom Qian never marks but CGED-Q lists as a Bordered White Hanjun in ten of his eleven records, matters more: counting him as a Bannerman leaves the executive estimates unchanged, lowers the internal fiscal estimate from +18.5 to +7.3 points, and gives contrasts of −66.6, −24.2, and +16.4 points with joint wild $p = 0.067$ (Appendix A.2). The main coding does not use the rosters, because they cover only 1850–1864 and only the officials who appear in them, so a correction from them would reach

some officials and not others; but the fiscal estimates depend on the identity of one official, and no conclusion in this paper rests on them. Conditioning on the number of names recorded in a year leaves the contrasts at -66.8 , -36.4 , and $+15.2$ points (Table B6 reports record density itself). The executive series was rebuilt for this paper from a full transcription of Qian’s governor and governor-general tables; it agrees with an earlier series built from the same source in 1,545 of 1,566 province-years, and with the earlier series the internal executive estimate would be $+50.4$ points instead of $+48.6$ (Appendix A.3).

Table 6. The office pattern across designs, codings, and samples

Comparison	External minus internal			Joint wild p	Fiscal minus judicial	
	Exec.	Fiscal	Judicial		E – I	Wild p
Main comparison (Table 2, Panel A)	-66.6	-35.5	$+15.4$	0.0587	-50.9	0.1157
Clusters by governor-general jurisdiction	-66.6	-35.5	$+15.4$	0.1875	-50.9	0.0840
Question-mark officials counted as non-Banner (Panel B)	-66.6	-43.7	$+36.2$	0.0002	-79.8	0.0017
Common episode onsets (Panel C)	-35.9	-40.3	$+3.7$	0.2472	-43.9	0.1865
Banner marks coded as printed in each year	-66.6	-33.6	$+15.6$	0.0547	-49.2	0.1099
Han Chun counted as a Bannerman (CGED-Q)	-66.6	-24.2	$+16.4$	0.0666	-40.6	0.2187
Marks harmonized within the commission tables	-66.6	-33.7	$+16.0$	0.0549	-49.7	0.1106
Condition on annual record-count categories	-66.8	-36.4	$+15.2$	0.0592	–	–
Drop Sichuan	-63.1	-34.2	$+11.4$	0.1166	-45.6	0.1509
Drop all 1850s internal stacks	-43.6	-75.7	$+21.8$	0.1150	-97.6	0.0821
Stacks weighted by their exposed provinces	-77.6	-32.1	$+17.3$	0.0169	-49.4	0.1202
Foreign wars dated by local fighting where it reached	-68.2	-32.4	$+20.2$	0.0554	-52.6	0.1183
Foreign-war windows ending with the war	-58.4	-33.9	$+22.6$	0.0930	-56.5	0.0980
Executive posts by year-end incumbent	-63.7	-35.5	$+15.4$	0.0839	-50.9	0.1157
Onsets aligned with Qian’s table years	-65.2	-35.5	$+16.2$	0.0585	-51.7	0.1041
Two-way fixed effects, all province-years	-23.1	-26.2	$+17.9$	0.1105	-44.1	0.0611

Notes: Recorded Banner percentage points. Rows 1–15 are stacked comparisons (Section 3.3); row 1 is the main specification. Row 2 repeats it with clusters by governor-general jurisdiction (eleven). Row 3 counts the 86 commissioners whom Qian marks with a question mark as non-Banner. Row 5 uses Banner marks exactly as printed in each annual cell instead of the person-level harmonization of Section 3, with question marks counted as Banner. Row 6 also counts as a Bannerman Han Chun, whom Qian prints without a mark and CGED-Q lists with a banner (Table A3). Row 7 harmonizes the commission marks within the commission tables only, which codes as non-Banner four officials whom Qian marks as Bannermen in the governor table but not in the commission tables (Bogui, Chengxun, Zhao Erxun, Bian Baoquan). Row 8 adds office-specific indicators for two and for three or more recorded names. Row 10 keeps the 1862 Northwest and 1899 Boxer stacks as the only internal episodes. Row 11 weights each stack’s comparison provinces so that each stack counts in proportion to its number of exposed provinces (Wing et al., 2024). Row 12 dates each foreign war by the first fighting in each province it reached, and Yunnan, which the Sino-French fighting did not reach, by the register’s 1884 (Table B5, note). Row 13 drops exposed years after the war’s end in the foreign-war stacks. Row 14 measures each executive post by its incumbent at the end of the year, omitting appointees who never took up the post. Row 15 moves the 1851 Taiping onset in Guangxi to the 1850 table year, which contains the Jintian rising of January 1851 (Appendix A). Row 16 is the two-way fixed-effects regression of Appendix B.2, with common onsets, all four exposure windows, and province–office and office–year effects. Eighteen province clusters except rows 2 (eleven jurisdictions) and 9 (seventeen).

The two-way fixed-effects regression on all province-years, with common onsets, gives contrasts of -23.1 , -26.2 , and $+17.9$ points, joint wild $p = 0.111$ (Appendix B.2). Its comparisons include provinces already at war elsewhere, whose own responses then enter the comparison group.

Five further checks concern how the executive estimate is formed. First, a stacked regression weights each stack by the variation in its exposure indicator, which depends on its numbers of exposed and comparison provinces (Wing et al., 2024). Appendix Table B5 reports each stack's estimate and its implicit weight: the executive estimate is positive in five of the seven rebellion stacks, and the 1853 stack carries 28 percent of the weight. Weighting each stack instead by its number of exposed provinces raises that share to 40 percent and gives an executive estimate of $+60.7$ points (wild $p = 0.0008$ with province clusters and 0.014 with jurisdiction clusters) and a contrast of -77.6 points ($p = 0.0004$ and 0.0020); the fiscal contrast becomes -32.1 points ($p = 0.071$ and 0.117). Second, dating each foreign war by the first fighting on a province's territory or coast where the fighting reached it, and keeping the register's 1884 date for Yunnan, whose troops fought in Tonkin but which the Sino-French fighting did not reach (note to Appendix Table B5), gives an executive contrast of -68.2 points ($p = 0.0022$ and 0.015) and a fiscal contrast of -32.4 points ($p = 0.067$ and 0.152). Third, ending each foreign war's window with the war gives -58.4 points for the executive ($p = 0.0072$ and 0.015) and -33.9 points for finance ($p = 0.122$ and 0.151). Fourth, the shares weight every name recorded in a year equally, so a brief acting appointment counts as much as a full year in office; measuring each post by the last official listed for it in Qian's table year (Appendix A), omitting appointees who never took up the post, gives an executive estimate of $+41.9$ points ($p = 0.0016$ and 0.020) and a contrast of -63.7 points ($p = 0.0036$ and 0.0020). Fifth, the panel's years are Qian's table years, which are Qing calendar years, while the onsets are Western years (Appendix A). The two differ for one onset of the main comparison: the Jintian rising of 11 January 1851, which opens the Taiping war in Guangxi, falls in the 1850 table year. Moving that onset to 1850 gives an executive estimate of $+47.2$ points ($p = 0.0005$ and 0.0078) and a contrast of -65.2 points ($p = 0.0017$ and 0.0059); with foreign wars also dated by local fighting in table years, which moves the Japanese landing in Shandong of January 1895 to the 1894 table year and leaves the French attack on Guangxi of February 1885 in 1885, the contrast is -65.6 points ($p = 0.0020$ and 0.017). The executive estimates hold under all five checks. The fiscal contrast, which in the main comparison has $p = 0.045$ with province clusters and 0.061 with jurisdiction clusters, does not reach the five percent level with either clustering under any of the first three.

The comparison has five limits. First, the estimates rest largely on one comparison, the provinces that the Taiping armies or the Nian reached in 1853, and on dating the Taiping war by arrival: without the 1853 stack the executive estimate is $+24.9$ points ($p = 0.025$ and 0.056), and with

common onsets it is +17.9 points ($p = 0.060$ and 0.080). Second, the comparison provinces in the Taiping-era stacks are the provinces the war did not reach in those years—Fujian, Gansu, Shaanxi, and Sichuan throughout, Zhejiang before 1858, and Guangdong, Guizhou, and Yunnan in the earliest stacks. Comparison provinces have no war onset and no first-three-year exposure inside the stack window, but they can be in the later years of an earlier war, which two indicators absorb, and they can be affected by unregistered mobilization. Third, officials were drawn from one empire-wide pool, and part of the estimate is a fall in the comparison provinces whose causes the sources do not record, so the estimates measure relative allocation (Section 4.4), and a shift common to all provinces, such as the movement of governorships toward Bannermen in the mid-1850s, is not attributed to exposure. Fourth, the effective number of independent units is small: eleven jurisdictions for the executive and eight for the governor-generalship, whose estimate is imprecise when each jurisdiction is counted once. Fifth, internal and external wars differed in scale, duration, and the decades in which they occurred; the contrast compares these bundles. The onset date is the documented arrival of Taiping armies for the Taiping war and the register’s onset date for the other episodes, except the Nian, which is dated to its 1853 organizational phase.

5 Who Was Appointed, and Where They Went

The shares are built from individual appointments. This section names the appointments behind the executive estimates of Section 4 and follows the Banner judicial commissioners whose departures from the courts were promotions. Appendix C.4 compares how Banner and other commissioners’ tenures ended over the whole period; that comparison depends on how the question-mark officials are coded, and it is not used as evidence for the argument here.

5.1 Appointments under rebellion and foreign war

When the Taiping armies reached the Yangzi and the north in 1853–1855, the court gave about half of the theater governorships to Bannermen: Yinggui in Henan and Fuji in Anhui from 1853, Hafen and then Hengchun in Shanxi in 1853–1854, Qinglin in Hubei in 1854, Jirhanga in Jiangsu and Chongen in Shandong from 1854, and Wenjun in Jiangxi from 1855; Yiliang became governor-general at Liangjiang in 1853 and Guanwen at Huguang in 1855 (Qian, 1980). Hunan, where Luo Bingzhang was organizing the defense, kept its Han governor. Several governorships of provinces the war had not reached also went to Bannermen in these years, Bogui in Guangdong and Shuxing’s in Yunnan among them, so it is the governor-generalships, more than the governorships, that set the theater apart (Section 4.2). Hu Linyi, a Hunan Army commander, already held Hubei from

1855; from 1860, as the regional armies took over the war, their Han commanders took most of the theater governorships and some regional commands: Zeng Guofan at Liangjiang in 1860, and Li Hongzhang in Jiangsu and Zuo Zongtang in Zhejiang in 1862. Other governor-generalships stayed with Bannermen longer: Guanwen held Huguang until 1867, and Qingduan and then Qiling held Min-Zhe until 1863.

Foreign war drew on a different record. In the Sino-French war the governors and governors-general of the theater provinces were Han officials, several of them products of the regional armies and frontier campaigns rather than of the examinations alone: Pan Dingxin and then Zhang Yao in Guangxi, Liu Mingchuan in Fujian, Yang Changjun as governor-general of Min-Zhe, and Cen Yuying in Yunnan; Li Bingheng governed Shandong through the Sino-Japanese war (Qian, 1980). In the First Opium War the record is mixed. When the war began in 1839, Bannermen held four of the seven executive posts in the theater: the Min-Zhe governor-generalship (Guiliang) and the governorships of Guangdong (Yiliang), Zhejiang (Wuergongge), and Jiangsu (Yuqian, acting from the spring of 1839); Han officials held Liangguang, Liangjiang, and the Fujian governorship. After the fighting began the court moved Bannermen into the two Han-held governor-generalships: Yilibu to Liangjiang in January 1840 (the 1839 table year) and Qishan to Liangguang in September 1840, while Yuqian took over Liangjiang in acting capacity in August 1840. Defeats brought dismissals, and by 1841 Han officials held several of these posts: Qi Gong at Liangguang, Niu Jian at Liangjiang, Yan Botao at Min-Zhe, and Liu Yunke in Zhejiang. For the negotiations of 1842 the court turned back to Bannermen, Qiying at Liangjiang and Yiliang at Min-Zhe (Qian, 1980). By the 1880s Han officials held most governorships everywhere, so these names illustrate rather than establish the foreign-war estimates, which compare theater provinces with other provinces in the same years. Rebellion widened the command of troops and levies held by governors-general and governors, and in its first years the court appointed Bannermen to many of these posts; in the later foreign wars the theater's executive posts went to officials with military records, several of them earned against the rebellions, and those officials were Han. Whether the later pattern reflects the court's preferences or the small number of Bannermen with war records is not settled by these comparisons (Section 3.2).

Wartime service also opened routes into the commissions for officials outside the Banners, through recommendation by the commanders they served. Yan Jingming ran supply and camp affairs under Hu Linyi before Hu recommended him for the Hubei judicial commission (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 438). Luo Bingzhang, sent to Sichuan against the Li-Lan rising, impeached the fiscal commissioner Xiangkui and recommended Liu Rong, a member of his military staff, for the acting commission; Qian dates the replacement to October 1861 (Qian, 1980, p. 1927), and the biographies describe the service and the recommendation (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406, 425). Appendix C.5 gives these and other appointment histories.

5.2 Promotion from the courts to the treasury

From the early 1860s, as the regional armies took over the war, Banner representation fell in both commissions (Figure 3). These later years lie mostly outside the three-year windows of Section 4, so the rosters do not trace the channel of the estimates there; they show what departures from an office meant. Linked quarterly rosters from the China Government Employee Database–Qing (CGED-Q) show where the Banner commissioners went (Chen et al., 2020; Campbell and Chen, 2022). The winter-1859 roster lists nineteen fiscal and eighteen judicial commissioners, among them nine fiscal and five judicial Bannermen. By summer 1862, none of the five Banner judicial commissioners remained in justice, but three of them, Yuduo, Yilin, and Enlin, were fiscal commissioners. Qian records their fiscal appointments to Fujian in May 1860, Guangdong in April 1861, and Gansu in January 1862. Their departure from justice was advancement, not exclusion from government.

Table 7 accounts for every change in the Banner headcounts between the two endpoints. Justice lost its five original Bannermen: three were then in finance and two were not listed in either commission. Two other Bannermen arrived in justice, giving $5 - 3 - 2 + 0 + 2 = 2$. Finance retained three of its original nine Bannermen and received the three judicial promotees, giving $9 - 0 - 6 + 3 + 0 = 6$. The interoffice movements cancel in the combined count, which fell from fourteen to eight; they changed where Banner officials served.

Table 7. Banner headcounts and observed interoffice movements, 1859–1862

	Fiscal	Judicial
Banner officials in winter 1859	9	5
Departures to the other commission	0	−3
Other departures from this office	−6	−2
Arrivals from the other commission	+3	0
Other arrivals into this office	0	+2
Banner officials in summer 1862	6	2

Notes: All listed Banner officials in the two commissions at winter 1859 and summer 1862. Departures and arrivals refer to the endpoint office categories, using supplied person identifiers. Other departures mean absence from the original commission, not necessarily departure from government; other arrivals were not in either baseline commission. The accounting covers observed endpoints, not every intervening move. Full cohort paths and the non-Banner accounting are reported in Appendix C and the replication data.

The same rosters show that Banner commissioners did not leave their office category faster than others while the war lasted. In 1860–1864, 64.3 percent of Banner fiscal commissioners were listed in the same office category in the next usable roster, against 41.4 percent of others, and 64.7 against 37.4 percent in justice; among governors and governors-general the ordering reversed, at 53.8 against 67.1 percent, a difference that is not significant ($p = 0.14$ with standard errors clustered by official). The fall in the fiscal share came mainly through entry: between 1854–1859 and 1860–1864

the Banner share of fiscal entrants fell by 30.4 points and that of all listed fiscal commissioners by 13.1. Appendix C.3 reports the entry and retention accounting. A fall in a group's share of an office can be advancement, continued service elsewhere, or exit, and the rosters separate them.

6 Conclusion

Rulers under threat must decide whom to trust with power, and the officials they trust most are not always the ones best able to do the work. This paper asks whether the kind of threat changes how rulers weigh the two, and in which offices. When a rebellion reached a Qing province, in the following three years the Banner share of its governors-general and governors rose by 49 percentage points relative to comparison provinces. After a foreign war no rise is detected, and the external-minus-internal contrast for the executive is -67 points. The commissions below the governor moved much less; the clear difference between the two threats is in the executive, the office that held a province's troops and money.

The executive pattern is consistent with an account in which reliability is worth most where a threat expands control over troops and money. Rebellion expanded that control most in the offices that commanded the theater provinces' troops, and in its first years the Banner share of those offices rose relative to comparison provinces as the posts that the war opened were filled. Foreign war raised the value of military ability against an outside enemy; in the wars with France and Japan the executive posts of the theater provinces went to Han officials, several with records earned against the rebellions.

Beyond the Qing, the lesson is more general. Whether a government gives insiders the offices that command troops and money can depend on the kind of threat it faces. A government facing unrest at home that gives command of its security forces to members of the ruler's own group is making a choice of this kind; one facing a foreign enemy may choose differently. Studies of political selection often ask who enters government; the Qing case shows that where insiders are placed can change with the threat. In the Qing, rebellion and foreign war moved the provincial executive differently.

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A Annual Measurement and Conflict Geography

A.1 Units, coverage, and source conventions

The eighteen-province grid contains 1,566 province-years and 4,698 civil office cells, all observed. Table A1 reports record density. Table A2 reports period averages; shared governors-general contribute to each province in their jurisdiction. Years are Qian's table years. Each is a Qing calendar year, which began between late January and late February of the Western year with the same number, so an appointment or dismissal dated in its last month or two can fall in January or February of the next Western year; it is counted in the table year, and the year-end incumbent of Table 6, row 14, is the last official listed for the table year. The onset years of the episodes are Western years. They fall in the table year of the same number except where a war reached a province in the first weeks of a Western year: the Jintian rising of 11 January 1851, which opens the Taiping war in Guangxi and falls in the twelfth month of the 1850 table year, and, in the local dating of foreign wars, the Japanese landing in Shandong on 20 January 1895, which falls in the twelfth month of the 1894 table year. The French attack on Zhennanguan in Guangxi in late February 1885 came after the Qing new year of 15 February and stays in the 1885 table year. Section 4.7 reports estimates with the two onsets moved to their table years.

Table A1. Civil coverage and annual record density

Office	Observed cells	Records per cell	One record	Two records	Three or more	Maximum records
Executive	1,566	2.32	374	619	573	8
Fiscal	1,566	1.63	849	530	187	7
Judicial	1,566	1.67	761	603	202	5

Notes: Full 1825–1911 panel before onset exclusions. Multiple names can reflect replacement, acting service, or other separately listed officeholders.

Annual cells retain separately listed names, including acting and explicitly not-assumed appointments. Jiangsu's fiscal records include both Suzhou and Jiangning. The judicial category spans the late-Qing change from *ancha shi* to *tifa shi*; the title and remit changed in Xuantong 2 (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 119). The relevant edict names reassigned officials (Qing court, n.d.d, juan 39, Xuantong 2, lunar month 7, renxu).

Both transcriptions record Qian's printed mark, which distinguishes the Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun Banners and the imperial lineage. The executive series is compared with an earlier series built from the same source in Appendix A.3, and the commission marks with the CGED-Q rosters in Table A3.

Table A2. Average recorded civil Banner shares by period

Period	Province-years	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial
1825–1849	450	44.08	22.11	28.96
1851–1864	252	38.99	32.44	27.18
1865–1880	288	9.12	21.77	29.05
1881–1911	558	25.06	21.98	27.18

Notes: Percent, averaging province-years equally; every province-year has all three offices observed. Commissioners marked with a question mark are counted as Bannermen. The Taiping interval is 1851–1864; 1850 is not included in these period rows.

A.2 Re-transcription of the commission tables

The fiscal and judicial commission tables of Qian’s third volume were transcribed again for 1825–1911: 5,238 entries, of which 5,211 are main entries for an official in a province and year and 27 are acting appointments noted inside another official’s entry, which the panel excludes. Each entry records the name, the printed affiliation mark, the dated annotation of appointment or departure, and the book and file page. The two Jiangsu fiscal commissions, at Suzhou and Jiangning, are pooled; Xinjiang and Taiwan are transcribed but lie outside the eighteen-province panel.

Comparison with the earlier transcription identified three kinds of difference. Province alignment: Qian prints the province names in the outer margin of each page, and on odd-numbered pages of both tables, in many years, the earlier transcription had shifted a page’s names by one province; in the fiscal table it affected the pages for 1834–1835, 1841, and 1865 and, in the Taiping period, those for 1851, 1853, 1855, 1857, 1861, and 1863. The two transcriptions differ in 210 of the 3,132 commission cells, including 29 that were previously missing. With question-mark officials counted as non-Banner in both, the main comparison on the earlier transcription gives joint wild $p = 0.0002$ and a fiscal–judicial contrast of -71.1 points, against 0.0003 and -78.6 on the corrected transcription with the rebuilt executive series and the same within-table harmonization. Missing marks: seven officials marked as Bannermen in the book had been recorded without a mark. Unsupported marks: seven officials printed without a mark or with a question mark had been recorded as marked Bannermen. Under the main coding those with a question mark are Bannermen in any case; two of those printed without a mark, Bogui and Chengxun, are marked as Bannermen in Qian’s governor table and described as Bannermen in other sources, and the main coding, which gives each official the identity Qian prints for him in any of his tables, counts them as Bannermen (Section 4.7 reports the coding harmonized within the commission tables). Qian’s own marks are inconsistent for nine officials, who are marked in some years and not in others (eight of them in the main entries used by the panel); person-level harmonization codes them as Banner throughout. Page images of the pages with the largest corrections and a log of every changed cell are in the replication files.

With question marks counted as non-Banner in both transcriptions, the corrections lower the 1851–1864 mean fiscal Banner share from 27.91 to 22.19 percent, because the shifted pages fell in

Taiping-era years; means in other periods change by less than two points. The exit classification of Appendix C.4 uses the dated annotations of the same transcription.

Checking the marks against CGED-Q. The quarterly rosters of 1850–1864 in CGED-Q record identity independently of Qian: a Bannerman is listed by banner and division, a civilian by native province and county. Table A3 matches the commissioners Qian lists in 1849–1865 to these rosters by name, office (a commission or governorship), and year. Every official Qian marks as a Bannerman and every official he marks with a question mark who appears in the rosters is listed with a banner. Of the unmarked officials found, 139 are listed by native place, two with a banner, and one with neither. The two listed with a banner are Bogui, listed as a Plain Yellow Mongol, and Han Chun, listed as a Bordered White Hanjun in ten of his eleven records. Qian himself marks Bogui as a Mongol in the governor table, where he appears as governor of Guangdong from 1852, so the main coding, which gives each official the identity Qian prints for him in any of his tables, counts Bogui as a Bannerman; it does not count Han Chun, whom Qian never marks. Counting Han Chun as well leaves the executive estimates unchanged and lowers the internal fiscal estimate from +18.5 to +7.3 points, because Han Chun was Zhejiang’s fiscal commissioner in 1854–1856, when Zhejiang was a comparison province for the 1853 stack and had not yet reached its own onset in 1858; the contrasts become −66.6, −24.2, and +16.4 points, with joint wild $p = 0.067$ (Table 6, row 6). Names are matched exactly; allowing variant characters adds Zhongxiu, a question-mark official whom the rosters list as a Plain Red Manchu.

Table A3. Qian’s identity marks and the CGED-Q rosters, commissioners of 1849–1865

Qian’s mark	Officials	Found in CGED-Q	Listed in CGED-Q with		
			A banner	A native place	Neither
Marked as Bannermen	39	31	31	0	0
Marked with a question mark	25	19	19	0	0
No mark in the commission tables	217	142	2	139	1

Notes: Fiscal and judicial commissioners in Qian’s main entries for 1849–1865, classified by Qian’s marks in the commission tables, harmonized for each person within those tables. An official is found if a CGED-Q record of 1850–1864 carries the same name, in a commission or governorship, within a year of his Qian listing; his CGED-Q identity is the majority of his matched records that give a banner or a native place. Names are matched exactly. CGED-Q lists a Bannerman by banner and division and a civilian by native province and county. The nineteen question-mark officials found are listed as Manchu (fourteen), Hanjun (two), Mongol (one), and Imperial Household bondservants (two). The two unmarked officials listed with a banner are Bogui (Plain Yellow Mongol) and Han Chun (Bordered White Hanjun).

A.3 Governors and governors-general

The executive series is built from Qian's governor-general and governor tables (Qian, 1980, vol. 2). Both tables were transcribed entry by entry for 1825–1911: 3,141 main entries, 1,227 for governors-general and 1,914 for governors. Each entry records the printed name, the printed identity mark, the dated annotation of appointment and departure, and the book page. A main entry is a name printed in bold on the entry line of a cell. Officials named only inside another official's annotation, usually as acting holders, are not entries. The two supplementary pages for 1911 that list appointments made after the provinces declared independence are excluded. Of the 3,141 entries, 2,787 fall in the posts of the panel: the fifteen provincial governorships and the eight governor-generalships whose jurisdictions cover the eighteen provinces. The grain-transport and river posts, and the governorships of Taiwan, Xinjiang, and the northeast, are not part of the panel.

A governor-general is counted in every province of his jurisdiction, so the governor-general of Liangjiang appears in Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi; Zhili, Sichuan, and Gansu had a governor-general and no governor, as did Fujian after 1885 and Hubei, Guangdong, and Yunnan after 1904–1905; Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan had a governor and no governor-general. Banner identity follows the printed marks harmonized for each person across the governor, governor-general, and commission tables, with the question mark counted as Banner as in the commission series.

The series agrees exactly, in both the number of names and the Banner share, with an earlier series built from the same source, used in the first analyses, in 1,545 of 1,566 province-years. Six differences are in the number of names: the earlier series counted once an official who held a governorship and the governor-generalship of the same province in a year, or omitted a governor transferred within days of appointment, and in Sichuan in 1873 the earlier series listed Li Hanzhang, whom Qian records in that post only from 1875. Fifteen are in identity. In thirteen of them the earlier series had coded as non-Banner three officials whom Qian marks as Hanjun: Jiang Weiyuan in Guizhou in 1851–1860, Xu Zechun in Shandong in 1848–1849, and one of Yang Pei's two entries in Hubei in 1854. The remaining two are Chen Kuilong in Sichuan in 1908, a native of Guizhou whom the earlier series had coded as a Bannerman, and Zeng He in Hubei in 1898, whom Qian marks as a Manchu in the governor table and in the commission tables. Moving from the earlier series to this one changes the internal executive coefficient of the main comparison from +50.4 to +48.6 points.

The decision-level analysis of Section 4.3 uses the same entries. A spell is a run of consecutive annual main entries of one person in one post. Its first year is an appointment and its last year a departure, unless the spell runs to 1911. The departure is classified from the dated annotation of the last year: death, dismissal, removal, demotion, recall to the capital, illness or mourning, promotion, transfer, or detachment to military duty. Its origin is classified from the first arrival clause of the first year: a provincial commission, another governorship or governor-generalship, a Banner or military post such as a garrison generalship, a former official, or the capital. Two annotations were classified by hand: Buyantai's departure from Shaan-Gan in 1849, recorded as illness, and Yutai's in 1851,

recorded as death. Six spellings of a name that differ by a variant character or a transcription slip are merged; the list is in the replication files.

A.4 Episode register and provincial arrival dates

Jiangsu is included in the First Opium War and the northern-expedition provinces in the Taiping benchmark. Zhili's defensive mobilization during the Sino-Japanese War is distinguished from the combat criterion used to include Shandong. Zhejiang enters the Sino-French theater because of the Zhenhai fighting. The southwestern episode groups Yunnan and Guizhou conflicts at 1855, rather than assigning that date to the formal Yunnan Muslim rising usually dated to 1856 (Fay, 1975; Atwill, 2005; Jenks, 1994; Mokros, 2026).

Table A4. Benchmark episodes and provincial assignments

Episode	Type	Onset / historical end	Assigned provinces
Taiping	Internal	1851 / 1864	Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Zhili, Shandong
Nian	Internal	1851 / 1868	Anhui, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu
Southwestern rebellions	Internal	1855 / 1873	Yunnan, Guizhou
Northwest Muslim rebellion	Internal	1862 / 1877	Shaanxi, Gansu
Boxer movement	Internal	1899 / 1901	Zhili, Shanxi, Shandong
First Opium War	External	1839 / 1842	Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu
Second Opium War	External	1856 / 1860	Guangdong, Zhili
Sino-French War	External	1884 / 1885	Guangxi, Yunnan, Fujian, Zhejiang
Sino-Japanese War	External	1894 / 1895	Shandong
Eight-Nation Alliance	External	1900 / 1901	Zhili

Notes: A common episode onset is applied within each assigned set. Post-onset windows are +1 to +3 and +4 to +10; the historical end does not truncate them. Internal groups domestically organized conflict and mobilization; it is not synonymous with an anti-dynastic ideology. The main comparison replaces the Taiping and Nian onsets by the dates of Table A5.

Jiangsu's First Opium War assignment follows the fighting at Baoshan, Shanghai, and Zhenjiang (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 19, Daoguang 22). The northern-expedition provinces are included in the Taiping benchmark, although the expedition arrived after 1851. The main chronology in Table A5 follows provincial arrival along the southern, Yangtze, and northern routes. In Hubei, 1852 refers to Hanyang and neighboring operations, not the Gregorian date of Wuchang's fall in early 1853. For Shandong, 1854 refers to the Jinxiang–Linqing campaign, rather than earlier defensive preparations (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406, 425, 475).

Table A5. Province-specific Taiping arrival dates used in the main comparison

Province	Arrival year	Historical basis
Guangxi	1851	Outbreak in Guangxi
Hunan	1852	Arrival in southern Hunan
Hubei	1852	Hanyang and the Yangtze route
Jiangxi	1853	Jiujiang and the Nanchang campaign
Anhui	1853	Anqing and the eastward advance
Jiangsu	1853	Nanjing and the lower Yangtze
Henan	1853	Northern expedition
Shanxi	1853	Northern expedition
Zhili	1853	Northern expedition
Shandong	1854	Jinxiang and Linqing campaign
Zhejiang	1858	Shi Dakai's Zhejiang campaign; 1860 (Taiping arrival in Hangzhou) reported as a further alternative
Sichuan (expanded coverage)	1862	Shi Dakai's arrival and fighting at Shizhu and in southern Sichuan

Notes: Sources: *Qing shi gao*, juan 406 (Luo Bingzhang), 425 (Li Hui, Liu Rong), and 475 (Hong Xiuquan and Taiping campaigns). These annual arrival dates concern Taiping forces within the listed provinces, not the first fiscal burden, anticipation, or indirect effect of the rebellion. These are Taiping dates; the main comparison dates the Nian phase to 1853, as described below. The Sichuan expansion includes Li-Lan entry in 1859.

Sichuan's local war is independently documented. Luo Bingzhang's biography dates the Li-Lan campaign in Sichuan to Xianfeng 9 (1859), his own entry into Sichuan to 1861, and the campaign against Shi Dakai to Tongzhi 1–2 (1862–1863). It links Liu Rong's appointment directly to the provincial war administration (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406; see also juan 425). I do not assign Sichuan the Taiping national onset of 1851. In the stacked comparison it serves as a control, and one sensitivity removes it. In the two-way comparison another sensitivity adds a separate internal episode starting in 1859, with a historical end of 1865 for its extended suppression. Under the common window rule this creates 1860–1862 and 1863–1869 indicators. The combined comparison adds Taiping arrival in 1862 as well, using the same rule for overlaps.

The Nian overlap matters for interpreting a Taiping-only timing change. In the common-onset benchmark, Nian has the same 1851 onset and a subset of the Taiping provinces. With the logical-union exposure rule, deleting the Nian entry changes no benchmark indicator or onset exclusion. In the Taiping-only local-timing comparison, the Nian clock retains all twelve raw early flags in Anhui, Henan, Shandong, and Jiangsu during 1852–1854; eight remain in the estimation sample after local onset exclusions. The province-specific Taiping onset row of Table B8 therefore does not fully re-time early internal exposure in the shared theaters.

The combined-timing comparisons combine local Taiping dates with two Nian organizational-phase markers. Yuan Jiasan's biography describes fifty-eight bands combining and his dedicated Nian suppression assignment in Xianfeng 3 (1853); its Xianfeng 5 (1855) account describes Zhang Luoxing linking Anhui and Henan bands (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 418). Neither date is presented

as the first occurrence of Nian violence in all four provinces. In both combined-timing definitions, only three of the original twelve early province-years remain included as early observations. The main comparison uses the 1853 marker; Table B8 reports two-way estimates under both.

The row of Table B8 that excludes the Taiping theater-years under the common-onset benchmark removes all twelve Nian early cells and all twenty-eight Nian later cells. It also removes other overlapping exposure. It is consequently a deletion of a major conflict cluster, not an experiment that removes Taiping while leaving all other episodes intact. The replication data report the event-specific flags, their union, and onset exclusions separately.

The Boxer–Alliance exclusion removes Zhili, Shanxi, and Shandong observations in 1899–1911, including every registered Boxer province and the Alliance theater through the panel’s end. This removes a compound episode rather than assigning either domestic violence or intervention to a clean untreated category. The imperial annals’ account of 1900 records orders to suppress the movement, recruitment of Boxers, foreign military action, and renewed suppression after the court’s retreat (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 24, Guangxu 26).

B The Stacked Comparison and the Two-Way Fixed-Effects Comparison

B.1 Stacks, event time, and leave-one-out

Analysis sequence. The civil scope and the directional hypothesis developed from the sources and the initial office pattern; the finance–justice ordering was formulated after that pattern was observed. The first analyses estimated the two-way fixed-effects regression of Section B.2 with common episode onsets. After the commission tables were re-transcribed (Appendix A), the stacked comparison with province-specific Taiping arrival dates became the main design, because a pooled regression with staggered and overlapping exposure compares newly exposed provinces with provinces already at war. Both are reported in full. The officials whom Qian marks with a question mark are counted as Bannermen, following his explanatory notes, which were located after the first analyses; those analyses counted them as non-Banner, and Table 2, Panel B, reports that coding. All tables in this appendix use the main coding. Three further steps were taken after the main estimates had been seen. The executive series was rebuilt from a full transcription of the governor and governor-general tables (Appendix A.3); the executive share was split into the governor-generalship and the governorship (Section 4.2); and tests clustered by governor-general jurisdiction were added, because one governor-general’s appointment enters several provinces. The appointment, departure, and turnover margins of Section 4.3 were first estimated in a pooled two-way regression, which mixes comparisons in the same way as for the shares; the stacked estimates replace it, and Table B11 reports them with and without the onset year. The pooled regressions had shown no lean toward Bannermen among appointees. In the stacks the margins were first estimated for years one to three only, then with the onset year counted; turnover is significant only with the onset year. The failure-exit comparison was added last, after all the estimates above had been seen. The same runs estimated failure exits other than death, promotions, and all exits, for all posts and for each post type, with and without the onset year; Appendix B.3 reports the failure and dismissal results and the replication files the rest. The coding of failure exits was revised twice after independent checks of the annotations. The first coding counted every relief from office (*jie*) as a failure; many reliefs are transfers or recalls without a penalty, so relief now counts only when a penalty is recorded for it. A murder counted at first as a death in battle no longer does. Under the first coding, 12 of the 22 Banner incumbents of exposed posts and 19 of the 46 others left in failure; under the final one, 11 and 17. At the same time the all-posts column of Table B11 was given year effects specific to the post type, following the office-specific effects of the share regressions. This moved the all-posts estimates of the Banner-appointee difference from +20.6 to +11.4, of the Banner-minus-other exit difference from −3.1 to +22.8, and of the failure-exit difference from −5.4 to +16.1; the turnover estimate moved from +0.26 to +0.25. After an outside reading of the paper, the executive leave-one-out comparisons were re-estimated with jurisdiction clusters, and three changes to the onset register and the exclusion of appointments not taken up were added

(Table B4); all are reported. The remark in Section 2.4 on the transit tax was added at the same time, and an argument from the terms of foreign-war indemnities was dropped. In the final round of analysis, after a reader asked for a test of whether the rise was concentrated in the executive, the test of the executive against the mean of the two commissions was added (Table 2); all four specifications in which it was computed are reported, together with its pre-onset coefficients. The test that the three internal coefficients are equal (Table 2, note a) is not part of the stated hypothesis and is reported as descriptive. After a further outside reading of the paper, two changes were made. The commission marks, which had been harmonized within the commission tables, were harmonized across all of Qian’s tables, as the executive series already was, so that each official has one identity; this changed the internal fiscal estimate from +15.4 to +18.5 points and the joint test from $p = 0.055$ to 0.059 with province clusters and from 0.163 to 0.188 with jurisdiction clusters, and left the executive estimates unchanged (Table 6, row 7). And four checks were added: stacks weighted by their numbers of exposed provinces, foreign wars dated by the first local fighting where it reached a province, foreign-war windows ending with the war, and executive posts measured by year-end incumbents (Section 4.7); all are reported. A later reading prompted a fifth check, onsets aligned with Qian’s table years, which are Qing calendar years (Appendix A).

The estimates residualize the treatment design and outcome on the fixed effects, then calculate OLS coefficients and province-clustered CR1 covariance with the complete design rank. Provinces appear in several stacks, and clustering by province allows for that dependence. Wild tests impose each null, re-estimate the nuisance effects in each Rademacher pseudo-sample, and enumerate all 2^{G-1} sign vectors. Conventional intervals use t_{G-1} .

Table B1. Stacks in the main comparison


Onset	Type	Treated provinces	Controls
1839	External	Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang	14
1851	Internal	Guangxi	8
1852	Internal	Hubei, Hunan	6
1853	Internal	Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, Shanxi	5
1855	Internal	Guizhou, Yunnan	4
1856	External	Guangdong	4
1858	Internal	Zhejiang	4
1862	Internal	Gansu, Shaanxi	11
1884	External	Fujian, Guangxi, Yunnan, Zhejiang	14
1894	External	Shandong	17
1899	Internal	Shanxi	15

Notes: Each stack covers years -4 to $+3$ around its onset. Internal onsets follow the province-specific Taiping arrival dates of Table A5 and a common 1853 Nian phase date; a province’s event is its first internal onset in a cluster of onsets less than four years apart (Shandong: Nian 1853, Taiping 1854). Controls are provinces with no onset and no first-three-year exposure to any episode in the stack window. Treated provinces with another episode’s onset or early window inside the stack window are excluded: Zhili from the Taiping (1853) and Second Opium War stacks, Zhili and Shandong from the Boxer stack; the 1854 internal and 1900 external stacks have no remaining treated province. The common-onset version (Table 2, Panel C) applies the same rules to the onsets of Table A4.

Table B2. Event-time coefficients in the stacked comparison

	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial	Fiscal minus judicial
Internal, year -4	-9.21 (11.40)	-1.70 (14.81)	-12.03 (17.25)	+10.33 (28.75)
Internal, year -3	-9.77 (11.10)	+1.26 (13.51)	-7.75 (14.28)	+9.01 (25.50)
Internal, year -2	-8.52 (9.10)	-8.59 (9.20)	-0.21 (13.17)	-8.38 (20.68)
Internal, year +1	+47.82 (9.36)	+14.66 (14.76)	-31.11 (14.82)	+45.77 (28.30)
Internal, year +2	+48.08 (14.43)	+18.93 (14.83)	-27.83 (21.84)	+46.76 (34.08)
Internal, year +3	+29.21 (18.48)	+15.20 (13.32)	-15.26 (21.03)	+30.46 (26.16)
External, year -4	-27.73 (13.92)	+13.24 (18.84)	+11.97 (17.73)	+1.27 (27.82)
External, year -3	-14.88 (10.57)	+14.27 (11.66)	+1.14 (13.92)	+13.13 (18.39)
External, year -2	-3.05 (6.15)	+10.90 (8.80)	-4.91 (8.94)	+15.81 (12.80)
External, year +1	-23.13 (19.11)	-7.41 (15.84)	-7.78 (11.19)	+0.37 (17.42)
External, year +2	-31.51 (16.31)	-11.16 (12.84)	-2.18 (15.14)	-8.98 (18.67)
External, year +3	-33.31 (10.52)	-3.62 (14.05)	+2.66 (17.98)	-6.28 (24.01)
Internal leads, wild p	0.8480	0.3474	0.9136	0.5991
External leads, wild p	0.2050	0.6734	0.5525	0.6958

Notes: Coefficients on treated-by-event-time indicators relative to year -1, from the main stacked comparison; province-clustered CR1 standard errors in parentheses. The joint tests set the three leads (-4 to -2) of the stated type to zero; null-imposed wild bootstrap with eighteen clusters. These are the coefficients plotted in Figure 4; Figure B1 plots the pooled coefficients of Table 2.

**Figure B1.** Pooled coefficients, years one to three after onset

Notes: Panel A plots the internal and external coefficients of Table 2, Panel A; Panel B plots external minus internal. Intervals are pointwise 95 percent province-clustered CR1 intervals using the t_{17} critical value. Outcome: recorded Banner share, in percentage points.

Table B3. Leave-one-out comparisons for the stacked design

Omitted	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial	Joint wild p	Fiscal minus judicial	Gap wild p
None (main comparison)	-66.6	-35.5	+15.4	0.0587	-50.9 (31.8)	0.1157
<i>Omitted stack</i>						
External 1839 stack	-82.5	-40.1	+10.6	0.0505	-50.6 (33.8)	0.1433
External 1856 stack	-66.2	-31.3	+13.5	0.0858	-44.7 (32.3)	0.1653
External 1884 stack	-59.2	-36.2	+28.9	0.1172	-65.1 (33.4)	0.0741
External 1894 stack	-60.5	-37.4	+13.5	0.0897	-50.9 (31.9)	0.1262
Internal 1851 stack	-72.6	-37.2	+18.2	0.0232	-55.4 (31.0)	0.0838
Internal 1852 stack	-66.2	-31.3	+15.0	0.0499	-46.3 (32.2)	0.1547
Internal 1853 stack	-42.9	-41.2	+11.3	0.2154	-52.5 (35.9)	0.1544
Internal 1855 stack	-67.7	-38.9	+16.0	0.0604	-54.9 (34.7)	0.1215
Internal 1858 stack	-72.5	-40.4	+16.5	0.0650	-56.9 (33.6)	0.1017
Internal 1862 stack	-71.8	-27.0	+10.5	0.0616	-37.5 (29.4)	0.1943
Internal 1899 stack	-67.8	-32.7	+18.6	0.0550	-51.3 (34.1)	0.1357
All 1850s internal stacks	-43.6	-75.7	+21.8	0.1150	-97.6 (54.9)	0.0821
<i>Omitted province (seventeen clusters)</i>						
Anhui	-65.2	-39.6	+23.0	0.0416	-62.7 (31.3)	0.0602
Fujian	-65.1	-42.5	+10.6	0.1537	-53.1 (36.1)	0.1647
Gansu	-65.4	-29.3	+6.7	0.1114	-35.9 (29.0)	0.2038
Guangdong	-78.1	-23.9	+15.5	0.0142	-39.4 (33.6)	0.2394
Guangxi	-69.9	-40.5	+26.2	0.0207	-66.8 (30.2)	0.0372
Guizhou	-68.8	-35.4	+18.3	0.0421	-53.7 (33.6)	0.1133
Henan	-63.7	-33.6	+12.3	0.0779	-45.9 (32.5)	0.1608
Hubei	-65.1	-31.1	+11.3	0.0730	-42.4 (31.6)	0.1779
Hunan	-66.6	-36.5	+24.3	0.0302	-60.8 (31.4)	0.0635
Jiangsu	-72.8	-36.2	+15.5	0.0633	-51.7 (32.9)	0.1231
Jiangxi	-62.3	-38.5	+16.5	0.0658	-54.9 (32.2)	0.0955
Shaanxi	-64.7	-35.9	+18.6	0.0890	-54.4 (34.0)	0.1277
Shandong	-59.3	-35.3	+11.0	0.1128	-46.3 (34.1)	0.1808
Shanxi	-70.5	-33.3	+12.6	0.0675	-45.8 (34.3)	0.1815
Sichuan	-63.1	-34.2	+11.4	0.1166	-45.6 (31.2)	0.1509
Yunnan	-66.1	-42.5	+14.4	0.0862	-56.9 (34.7)	0.1077
Zhejiang	-67.1	-34.6	+14.4	0.1498	-49.0 (34.7)	0.1753
Zhili	-67.2	-35.2	+14.2	0.0632	-49.4 (33.0)	0.1388

Notes: External-minus-internal contrasts in recorded Banner percentage points from the main stacked comparison after removing one stack or one province (from every stack). The gap column is the fiscal-minus-judicial contrast with its CR1 standard error. Wild p -values enumerate all Rademacher sign vectors for the remaining clusters.

B.2 Two-way fixed-effects comparison

The two-way fixed-effects comparison uses all 1,566 province-years and the common onsets of Table A4:

$$B_{pjt}^{\text{rec}} = \alpha_{pj} + \lambda_{jt} + \sum_{c \in \{I, E\}} \sum_{h \in \{1, 2\}} \beta_{jch} D_{pt}^{c, h} + u_{pjt}, \quad (7)$$

where $D_{pt}^{c, 1}$ and $D_{pt}^{c, 2}$ indicate years one to three and four to ten after the onset of any type- c episode in province p . Same-type overlap activates an indicator once; onset years are dropped, leaving 4,608 office cells. The early windows cover 53 internal and 36 external province-years, two of them both. Province-by-office and office-by-year effects absorb permanent differences in provincial posts and common annual changes within each office. The estimates compare exposed province-years with all other province-years in the same year, including provinces exposed to another war, so the contrasts mix clean and contaminated comparisons (Goodman-Bacon, 2021).

Table B4. Leave-one-out and alternative onsets for the executive office

Omitted	Internal years 1–3	Wild p provinces	Wild p jurisdictions	External years 1–3
None (main comparison)	+48.6 (13.5)	0.0004	0.0078	–17.9 (14.6)
<i>Omitted stacks</i>				
External 1839 stack	+48.6 (13.5)	0.0004	0.0078	–33.9 (11.0)
External 1856 stack	+48.6 (13.4)	0.0004	0.0078	–17.6 (16.0)
External 1884 stack	+48.7 (13.5)	0.0004	0.0078	–10.5 (21.6)
External 1894 stack	+48.1 (13.5)	0.0005	0.0098	–12.4 (15.8)
Internal 1851 stack	+54.8 (13.3)	0.0001	0.0059	–17.8 (14.6)
Internal 1852 stack	+48.2 (15.2)	0.0013	0.0117	–18.0 (14.6)
Internal 1853 stack	+24.9 (10.3)	0.0254	0.0557	–17.9 (14.6)
Internal 1855 stack	+49.7 (14.7)	0.0010	0.0117	–17.9 (14.6)
Internal 1858 stack	+54.6 (13.8)	0.0006	0.0137	–17.9 (14.5)
Internal 1862 stack	+53.9 (17.2)	0.0004	0.0078	–17.9 (14.6)
Internal 1899 stack	+49.9 (15.1)	0.0040	0.0273	–17.9 (14.6)
All 1850s internal stacks	+25.9 (15.5)	0.2574	0.1895	–17.7 (14.4)
Taiping and Nian stacks (1851–1853, 1858)	+31.7 (12.5)	0.0454	0.0273	–17.7 (14.5)
<i>Omitted province (seventeen province clusters)</i>				
Anhui	+46.3 (13.8)	0.0009	0.0078	–18.9 (14.9)
Fujian	+49.7 (14.3)	0.0017	0.0254	–15.5 (18.3)
Gansu	+48.6 (15.3)	0.0030	0.0195	–16.7 (16.0)
Guangdong	+50.9 (13.4)	0.0002	0.0059	–27.2 (14.8)
Guangxi	+55.4 (13.2)	0.0001	0.0059	–14.5 (15.4)
Guizhou	+50.5 (13.6)	0.0003	0.0059	–18.3 (14.6)
Henan	+45.0 (13.4)	0.0011	0.0137 [†]	–18.8 (14.4)
Hubei	+48.6 (14.0)	0.0006	0.0098	–16.5 (14.4)
Hunan	+49.3 (14.1)	0.0006	0.0098	–17.3 (14.5)
Jiangsu	+46.9 (14.1)	0.0010	0.0078	–25.9 (14.4)
Jiangxi	+46.4 (13.9)	0.0009	0.0059	–15.9 (14.4)
Shaanxi	+47.1 (15.3)	0.0017	0.0176	–17.5 (15.4)
Shandong	+45.5 (13.7)	0.0010	0.0156 [†]	–13.8 (16.0)
Shanxi	+54.3 (14.7)	0.0013	0.0156 [†]	–16.3 (14.1)
Sichuan	+42.1 (12.9)	0.0039	0.0586 [†]	–21.0 (13.4)
Yunnan	+48.3 (13.8)	0.0006	0.0098	–17.8 (15.6)
Zhejiang	+54.9 (14.3)	0.0021	0.0254	–12.2 (16.0)
Zhili	+48.7 (13.5)	0.0004	0.0078 [†]	–18.6 (14.8)
<i>Alternative onsets and coding (nothing omitted)</i>				
Nian onset 1855 instead of 1853	+53.8 (15.8)	0.0004	0.0059	–
Nian removed from the register	+54.0 (15.8)	0.0004	0.0078	–
Taiping arrival in Zhejiang 1860 instead of 1858	+52.6 (12.1)	0.0003	0.0059	–
Appointments not taken up excluded	+50.2 (14.1)	0.0005	0.0098	–

Notes: Executive-office regression of the main stacked comparison (stack-by-province and stack-by-year effects, later-window indicators) after removing the stated stacks or province, or with the stated change to the onset register or the executive series. Recorded Banner percentage points; CR1 standard errors with province clusters in parentheses; wild p -values for the internal coefficient enumerate all Rademacher sign vectors, with eighteen province clusters (seventeen when a province is omitted) or eleven governor-general-jurisdiction clusters ([†]ten, when the omitted province was its own cluster). The last row drops entries that Qian marks as not taken up or not yet arrived in that year (49 entries in the panel's posts). The executive estimates do not depend on the coding of question marks.

The office pattern has the same signs as in the stacked comparison and smaller executive and fiscal magnitudes, and the joint test does not reject equal contrasts (Table B7). Its pre-exposure coefficients (Table B9 and Figure B2) show executive representation in the years before internal onset below the reference level, province-years outside all event windows, as discussed in Section 4.5; the judicial coefficients rise before onset, but not significantly. Dating the Taiping war by provincial arrival raises the executive contrast and lowers the joint p -value to between 0.05 and 0.09 (Table B8);

Table B5. The executive estimate stack by stack, and the weights of the stacks

Onset	Exposed provinces	Comparison provinces	Executive estimate	Weight of the stack	
				Regression	By exposed provinces
<i>Rebellion stacks</i>					
1851	Guangxi	8	−14.5	0.09	0.07
1852	Hubei, Hunan	6	+52.8	0.15	0.13
1853	Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, Shanxi	5	+108.1	0.28	0.40
1855	Guizhou, Yunnan	4	+41.9	0.14	0.13
1858	Zhejiang	4	−16.6	0.08	0.07
1862	Gansu, Shaanxi	11	+18.4	0.15	0.13
1899	Shanxi	15	+37.2	0.10	0.07
<i>Foreign war stacks</i>					
1839	Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang	14	+7.0	0.39	0.40
1856	Guangdong	4	−21.1	0.10	0.10
1884	Fujian, Guangxi, Yunnan, Zhejiang	14	−29.4	0.39	0.40
1894	Shandong	17	−57.7	0.12	0.10
Rebellion coefficient, regression weights (Table 2)			+48.6	$p = 0.0078$	
Rebellion coefficient, stacks weighted by exposed provinces			+60.7	$p = 0.0137$	
Foreign-war minus rebellion, stacks weighted by exposed provinces			−77.6	$p = 0.0020$	

Notes: Main comparison, executive share. Each stack’s estimate is the exposed-minus-comparison difference from a regression on that stack alone, with province and year effects and the later-window indicators. The regression weight is the stack’s share of the variation in the exposure indicator left after the fixed effects and other regressors, which is how the pooled coefficient averages the stacks; the weights of each war type sum to one, and the weighted average of the stack estimates is close to the pooled coefficient (the later-window indicators are common to all stacks). The last column weights each stack by its number of exposed provinces; the corresponding coefficients weight each comparison province of stack s by $(n_s^T/N^T)/(n_s^C/N^C)$ within each war type (Wing et al., 2024). p : wild bootstrap, clusters by governor-general jurisdiction. Foreign wars dated by the first fighting on each province’s territory or coast where the fighting reached it (Table 6, row 12): First Opium War, Guangdong 1839, Fujian and Zhejiang 1840, Jiangsu 1842; Second Opium War, Guangdong 1856, Zhili 1858; Sino-French War, Fujian 1884, Guangxi and Zhejiang 1885, and Yunnan, whose troops fought in Tonkin but which the fighting did not reach, at the register’s 1884; Sino-Japanese War, Shandong 1895.

removing one episode from the exposure register, or one province from the sample, at a time leaves all signs unchanged (Table B10). A removed episode’s province-years stay in the sample and count as unexposed unless another episode covers them, so the episode rows test the exposure coding rather than drop the war’s observations, unlike the dropped stacks of Table B3.

B.3 Governors-general and governors: event time and appointments

Figure B3 shows the governor-general and governor series by year. Before a rebellion’s onset the governor-general coefficients are +5.8, +5.6, and −10.1 points, against +56.4, +64.6, and +50.2 in the three years after; the pre-onset coefficients do not differ jointly from zero at the 5 percent level (wild $p = 0.16$ with jurisdiction clusters and 0.09 with province clusters), nor do the governor’s (0.74 and 0.68). After a foreign war’s onset the governor-general coefficients are negative, but so

Table B6. Record density in the stacked comparison

Office	Internal	External	External minus internal	Wild p
<i>Names per cell</i>				
Executive	+0.49 (0.20)	+0.26 (0.23)	−0.23 (0.30)	0.4222
Fiscal	+0.40 (0.17)	−0.12 (0.16)	−0.52 (0.18)	0.0079
Judicial	+0.37 (0.26)	−0.06 (0.20)	−0.44 (0.33)	0.1908
Joint equality, wild p				0.5874
<i>More than one name ($\times 100$)</i>				
Executive	+8.05 (8.49)	−6.21 (7.37)	−14.26 (9.95)	0.1893
Fiscal	+18.90 (9.84)	−18.18 (8.56)	−37.08 (10.18)	0.0007
Judicial	+17.70 (15.18)	−15.29 (13.31)	−33.00 (17.46)	0.0353
Joint equality, wild p				0.1863

Notes: Same stacks, effects, and inference as Table 2, Panel A, with the number of recorded names in an annual cell, or an indicator for more than one name, as the outcome. More names can reflect succession, acting appointments, or nominal appointments, so these are measures of record density, not of turnover.

Table B7. Two-way fixed-effects comparison: all four exposure windows

Office	Internal 1–3	Internal 4–10	External 1–3	External 4–10	External minus internal, 1–3	Wild p
Executive	+2.36 (5.50)	−12.30 (7.36)	−20.69 (6.25)	−15.78 (4.95)	−23.06 (9.87)	0.0372
Fiscal	+10.14 (12.12)	−0.73 (9.40)	−16.05 (5.65)	−8.08 (4.75)	−26.20 (13.60)	0.0934
Judicial	−7.80 (6.97)	+1.45 (10.85)	+10.08 (9.81)	−2.37 (6.52)	+17.88 (12.87)	0.1927

Notes: Equation (7) with common episode onsets, province and year effects, all four exposure windows, onset years excluded; 1,536 province-years per office. Province-clustered CR1 standard errors. Joint equality of the three early contrasts: $N = 4,608$, clustered $p = 0.0660$, wild $p = 0.1105$; with clustering by province and by year, clustered $p = 0.0714$.

Table B8. Two-way fixed-effects comparison: timing, geography, and sample

Comparison	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial	Joint wild p	N
Common episode onsets	−23.06 (9.87)	−26.20 (13.60)	+17.88 (12.87)	0.1105	4,608
Exclude years −2 and −1	−22.96 (10.06)	−23.86 (14.51)	+13.86 (13.15)	0.2113	4,434
Exclude years −3 to −1	−21.94 (10.15)	−21.45 (15.19)	+12.24 (13.87)	0.3074	4,347
Zhejiang Taiping onset 1858	−24.33 (9.61)	−17.00 (14.80)	+16.70 (12.23)	0.1374	4,608
Province-specific Taiping onset	−35.43 (9.86)	−17.01 (13.24)	+17.91 (12.14)	0.0560	4,596
Local Taiping + Nian 1853	−36.76 (10.17)	−18.23 (13.94)	+18.62 (13.49)	0.0724	4,605
Local Taiping + Nian 1855	−34.87 (10.43)	−17.44 (13.53)	+22.39 (14.12)	0.0783	4,596
Exclude Sichuan	−24.99 (9.84)	−23.91 (14.03)	+18.25 (13.90)	0.1443	4,347
Add Sichuan Li–Lan episode	−19.55 (10.28)	−27.14 (12.74)	+20.57 (12.56)	0.0853	4,605
Exclude Boxer–Alliance theaters, 1899–1911	−24.61 (10.00)	−28.88 (16.13)	+15.42 (12.61)	0.1582	4,503
Exclude Taiping theater-years	−30.83 (12.27)	−29.10 (16.12)	+7.23 (17.00)	0.3353	4,182

Notes: External-minus-internal early contrasts in recorded Banner percentage points, CR1 standard errors in parentheses, from Equation (7). Exclusion rows remove the stated pre-onset years of every episode in its assigned provinces, or the stated theater-years. The Sichuan exclusion has seventeen clusters.

Table B9. Two-way fixed-effects comparison: pre-exposure coefficients

Lead	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial	Fiscal minus judicial
Internal, year −1	−4.97 (8.92)	−5.26 (11.63)	+18.81 (10.93)	−24.08 (19.43)
Internal, year −2	−15.85 (6.49)	−9.64 (7.66)	+7.55 (9.22)	−17.20 (13.60)
Internal, year −3	−11.21 (5.75)	−6.66 (9.31)	+0.61 (11.08)	−7.26 (13.59)
Internal, year −4	−9.69 (6.69)	−18.10 (10.04)	+6.13 (10.10)	−24.22 (13.19)
External, year −1	+10.89 (11.43)	−0.58 (11.46)	+4.43 (12.68)	−5.00 (16.32)
External, year −2	+10.64 (11.90)	+13.04 (12.79)	+2.57 (12.15)	+10.47 (19.59)
External, year −3	+0.69 (9.16)	+9.63 (8.18)	+12.54 (10.78)	−2.91 (13.91)
External, year −4	−7.80 (9.42)	−0.39 (13.35)	+15.49 (12.54)	−15.89 (23.61)
Four internal leads, wild p	0.1898	0.3333	0.4465	0.1008
Four external leads, wild p	0.5207	0.7294	0.8300	0.7283

Notes: Equation (7) with four leads for each war type added; an observation can be a lead of one episode and in the post-onset window of another. Year −1 is estimated. CR1 standard errors in parentheses; null-imposed wild tests with eighteen clusters.

Table B10. Two-way fixed-effects comparison: one episode removed from the exposure register, or one province left out

Omitted	Executive	Fiscal	Judicial	Joint wild p	Fiscal minus judicial	Gap wild p
None (common onsets)	−23.1	−26.2	+17.9	0.1105	−44.1	0.0611
Taiping	−27.1	−20.3	+16.6	0.0995	−36.8	0.1199
Nian	−23.1	−26.2	+17.9	0.1105	−44.1	0.0611
Southwestern rebellions	−22.1	−26.9	+26.8	0.0475	−53.7	0.0272
Northwest Muslim rebellion	−18.9	−17.0	+16.8	0.1457	−33.8	0.1022
Boxer movement	−28.2	−29.6	+14.7	0.1322	−44.3	0.0811
First Opium War	−23.2	−32.5	+13.9	0.1520	−46.3	0.1136
Second Opium War	−27.1	−23.1	+13.4	0.1995	−36.5	0.1673
Sino-French War	−26.0	−26.4	+36.9	0.0457	−63.2	0.0102
Sino-Japanese War	−19.6	−24.5	+11.2	0.1970	−35.7	0.0965
Eight-Nation Alliance	−18.2	−24.7	+15.9	0.1339	−40.6	0.0644
Anhui	−22.4	−28.7	+18.3	0.1099	−47.1	0.0551
Fujian	−17.9	−32.6	+19.3	0.0931	−51.9	0.0300
Gansu	−22.1	−18.1	+13.1	0.2036	−31.2	0.1434
Guangdong	−29.5	−20.7	+23.6	0.0337	−44.2	0.1056
Guangxi	−26.5	−28.0	+19.7	0.0905	−47.7	0.0527
Guizhou	−23.4	−22.0	+21.4	0.1260	−43.4	0.0928
Henan	−21.0	−27.5	+14.7	0.1583	−42.3	0.0729
Hubei	−23.2	−24.4	+19.7	0.1078	−44.1	0.0645
Hunan	−23.7	−27.5	+22.4	0.0442	−49.9	0.0265
Jiangsu	−25.8	−27.7	+16.6	0.1259	−44.2	0.0670
Jiangxi	−22.6	−28.7	+18.3	0.0843	−47.0	0.0410
Shaanxi	−20.0	−25.3	+14.7	0.2172	−40.0	0.1247
Shandong	−24.9	−25.9	+10.0	0.2032	−35.9	0.1283
Shanxi	−20.7	−26.6	+17.5	0.1445	−44.1	0.0707
Sichuan	−25.0	−23.9	+18.2	0.1443	−42.2	0.0860
Yunnan	−23.1	−32.5	+21.8	0.0849	−54.3	0.0340
Zhejiang	−22.5	−25.0	+16.9	0.1783	−41.8	0.0904
Zhili	−21.0	−24.8	+15.2	0.2131	−40.0	0.1151
Taiping and Nian together	−26.9	−32.6	+12.7	0.2545	−45.2	0.1525

Notes: Equation (7); an omitted episode's province-years remain as unexposed unless covered by another episode. The gap is the matched fiscal-minus-judicial contrast on common support.




Figure B2. Two-way fixed-effects event study with common onsets

Notes: Coefficients on single-year indicators for years -6 to -1 and $+1$ to $+6$ relative to any same-type episode onset, and on a pooled indicator for years $+7$ to $+10$, with both war types entered together; province and year effects; reference category is province-years outside all plotted windows. Pointwise 95 percent province-clustered CR1 intervals with the t_{17} critical value.

are those before it (joint wild $p = 0.047$ with jurisdiction clusters and 0.060 with province clusters), so the foreign-war estimate for this post has no settled baseline.




Figure B3. Governors-general and governors by year relative to onset

Notes: Event-time coefficients relative to year -1 from separate stacked regressions for the governor-general and governor series (stack-by-province and stack-by-year effects, later-window indicators). Bars are 95 percent intervals from province-clustered CR1 standard errors with t_{14} (each series is observed in fifteen provinces); Appendix B.3 reports lead tests with province and jurisdiction clusters. A governor-general is counted in each province of his jurisdiction.

Table B11 reports the decision margins of Section 4.3. A post is a governorship or a governor-generalship; a governor-generalship counts as exposed in a stack when at least one of its provinces is exposed in that stack and each of the others is exposed or a comparison province, as a comparison post when all its provinces are comparison provinces, and is left out of the stack otherwise. Inference clusters by governor-general jurisdiction. Panel A counts the onset year as post-onset, because the court's first responses to a war fall in that year; Panel B drops it for exposed posts, as the share comparison does. Departures rose for both groups as turnover rose, and the gap between Banner and other incumbents did not change significantly: Banner incumbents of exposed posts left office less often than others before onset as well as after.

The failure exits of Section 4.3 are coded from Qian's annotations. A tenure counts as a failure exit if its annotation records a penalty for it, at its end or later—dismissal (including dismissal for

flight and dismissal after recall or relief), demotion, arrest, referral for deliberation or investigation, or execution—or if it ended in death in battle or by suicide during the fighting. Relief from office, recall, transfer, and departure for mourning or illness count only when such a penalty is recorded; most reliefs in the annotations are transfers or recalls without one. A penalty that falls on an acting official is not attributed to the incumbent, and a murder is not counted as a death in battle. Two Banner cases show the reach of the rule: Chonglun left the Hubei governorship for mourning in March 1854 and was stripped of his rank in June, and Yuxian was relieved of the Shanxi governorship in 1900 and executed months later; both count. Lebin, dismissed from Shaan-Gan in February 1862 for his handling of a rising in 1861, counts in the onset year of the 1862 Northwest stack, although the cause predates its registered onset.

In the all-posts column of Table B11 the stack-by-year effects are specific to the post type, as the office effects are in the share regressions. Counting the onset year, the Banner-minus-other difference in failure exits is then +16.1 points (SE 22.1); dropping it, +19.2 (SE 31.5; wild $p = 0.69$); for failure exits other than death, +13.8 (SE 18.9). With year effects common to the two posts, the failure estimates are −5.4 (SE 15.1) and −9.1 (SE 22.7), the exit estimate −3.1 (SE 22.0), and the turnover estimate +0.26. The two specifications differ because Banner incumbents are few: with post-type year effects, 28 of the 55 Banner incumbent-years in exposed posts from onset fall in cells with no Banner incumbent of the same post type in a comparison post in the same stack and year, and do not contribute to the estimate (9 with common year effects). Neither estimate is informative about the size of any Banner difference; the raw rates in Section 4.3 are the simpler summary. By person, 4 of the 8 Bannermen and 4 of the 9 other officials who held an exposed governor-generalship from onset left it in failure within the window, as did 7 of the 16 Bannermen and 13 of the 38 others who held an exposed governorship. Three officials held both kinds of post, Yang Pei and Hengchun among the Bannermen and Zhang Liangji among the others, so these counts exceed the totals in Section 4.3, which count each person once, by two Bannermen and one other official. The governor column is not informative on this margin: it rests on fourteen Banner incumbent-years in exposed governorships before onset, none ending in failure, and on Banner governors of comparison provinces, none of whom left in failure after onset; in Panel B the linear estimate exceeds one hundred points.

The other three Bannermen appointed to exposed governor-generalships were Yang Pei, a Hanjun promoted from the Hubei governorship in 1854; Qingduan, promoted from the Fujian governorship to Min-Zhe in 1859; and Xilin, appointed to Shaan-Gan from the Board of Revenue in 1862. The governorships of exposed provinces went to officials from the capital boards and the provincial commissions, Bannermen and Han alike, and many of both were dismissed within two years.

Table B11. Turnover, appointments, and departures in the governorships

	All posts	Governors-general	Governors
<i>A. Onset year and years 1–3 after onset</i>			
Appointments per post and year	+0.25 (0.13)	+0.35 (0.26)	+0.20 (0.20)
wild <i>p</i>	0.037	0.328	0.359
Banner appointee (percentage points)	+11.4 (11.7)	+70.9 (38.8)	−10.9 (13.5)
wild <i>p</i>	0.236	0.062	0.414
appointments (all; to exposed posts after onset)	570; 56	177; 13	393; 43
Exit, Banner minus other incumbents (pp)	+22.8 (22.0)	+9.6 (32.8)	+4.7 (42.3)
wild <i>p</i>	0.424	0.844	0.930
Failure exit, Banner minus other incumbents (pp)	+16.1 (22.1)	−4.0 (28.7)	+47.7 (24.0)
wild <i>p</i>	0.637	0.891	0.324
<i>B. Years 1–3 after onset only</i>			
Appointments per post and year	+0.10 (0.10)	+0.28 (0.27)	−0.01 (0.16)
wild <i>p</i>	0.301	0.500	0.941
Banner appointee (percentage points)	+10.6 (13.4)	+64.3 (48.8)	−5.9 (14.4)
wild <i>p</i>	0.367	0.375	0.637
appointments (all; to exposed posts after onset)	532; 34	163; 9	369; 25
Exit, Banner minus other incumbents (pp)	+37.2 (26.0)	+16.8 (42.8)	+40.6 (25.6)
wild <i>p</i>	0.473	0.812	0.344
Failure exit, Banner minus other incumbents (pp)	+19.2 (31.5)	−2.6 (34.1)	+105.9 (18.0)
wild <i>p</i>	0.688	0.938	0.203

Notes: Stacked comparison of the main design (same stacks, windows, and comparison provinces), at the level of posts: a governorship, or a governor-generalship counted as exposed when at least one of its provinces is exposed and each of the others is exposed or a comparison province. Coefficients on rebellion exposure in the onset year and the three years after (Panel A) or in the three years after, with the onset year of exposed posts dropped as in the share comparison (Panel B); foreign-war exposure is estimated alongside. Appointments: one observation per appointment (the first year of a run of annual entries), outcome 100 if the appointee is a Bannerman. Turnover: one observation per post and year, outcome the number of appointments. Exits: one observation per incumbent and year, outcome 100 if the incumbent left the post that year; the coefficient is the change at onset in the difference between Banner and other incumbents. Failure exits: as exits, with outcome 100 if the tenure ended that year and a penalty for it is recorded, at its end or later—dismissal (including for flight and after recall or relief), demotion, arrest, referral for deliberation or investigation, or execution—or if it ended in death in battle or by suicide during the fighting; relief, recall, transfer, and departure for mourning or illness count only with such a penalty (Appendix B.3). In the governor column the failure-exit estimate rests on fourteen Banner incumbent-years in exposed governorships before onset, none ending in failure, and is not informative. Stack-by-post and stack-by-year effects (interacted with Banner status for exits and failure exits); in the all-posts column the stack-by-year effects are also specific to the post type, governor-general or governor. Standard errors clustered by governor-general jurisdiction (eleven clusters: eight jurisdictions and Shandong, Shanxi, Henan; eight in the governor-general column, nine in the governor column); wild *p* enumerates all sign vectors.

C Roster Construction and Appointment Evidence

C.1 Dates, coverage, and linkage

CGED-Q transcribes officials listed in the *Jinshen lu* and related publications (Chen et al., 2020; Campbell et al., 2019). The 1850–1864 file released on 19 April 2022 used here contains 354,938 records in twenty-seven edition codes. Standardized senior titles and duplicate consolidation give 1,547 executive, fiscal, and judicial person–edition records. One 1860 edition has no secure season; dropping its 59 records leaves 1,488 records in twenty-six dated editions. Chronological pairs are formed after that exclusion, so winter 1859 connects to autumn 1860 with a three-quarter gap.

The primary comparison requires both commission categories’ slots to be printed at each endpoint and a gap of at most four quarters. A printed vacant slot satisfies coverage but contributes no incumbent to the person denominator. Twelve qualified earlier pairs end in 1854–1859 and six later pairs end in 1860–1864. The selected pairs and every person contributing to each denominator are listed in the replication data.

Strict same-office continuation uses an exact normalized name, at least one agreeing and no conflicting stable attribute (native province or county, banner, or division), and a unique match. The bridge across the omitted edition is constructed by the same rule. Unmatched endpoint records count as entry into the observed office category, which can include promotion, return, absence from an earlier roster, or linkage error. Continued presence allows a transfer between provinces. A supplied-ID comparison uses the linked person identifiers (Campbell and Chen, 2022) (Table C1); the one damaged-name judicial node without an ID is retained as unlinked, not dropped. The fixed winter-1859 cohort has complete identifiers.

Table C1. Entry and incumbent changes under two linkage rules

Office	Linkage	Change in entrant Banner share	Change in incumbent Banner share
Fiscal	Strict	−30.36	−13.06
Fiscal	Supplied IDs	−34.22	−13.06
Judicial	Strict	−18.31	−19.14
Judicial	Supplied IDs	−18.74	−19.14

Notes: Percentage-point changes from the earlier to the later paired rosters. Both linkage rules use the same dated editions and observed people; only the division into entrants and continuers differs. The incumbent stock is consequently identical.

C.2 Denominators and the winter-1859 cohort

The fiscal category has nineteen slots because Jiangsu has distinct Suzhou and Jiangning commissions. The judicial category has eighteen. Person totals need not equal slot totals. In the earlier period, Yuke is listed simultaneously in two provincial judicial slots in one edition and counted once

as a person, producing $215 = 12 \times 18 - 1$ judicial person–edition observations. The early fiscal total is $228 = 12 \times 19$.

In autumn and winter 1860 the Suzhou fiscal slot is printed as vacant. Those endpoints each have eighteen fiscal incumbents, and the next four dated endpoints each have nineteen. Thus the later fiscal total in Table C3 is $112 = 2 \times 18 + 4 \times 19$; the later judicial total is $108 = 6 \times 18$. Table C2 reports every dated endpoint and the changing numbers of occupants.

Table C2. Complete dated follow-up and endpoint composition

A. Original cohort members listed in the same office category

Roster	Fiscal cohort		Judicial cohort	
	Banner	Non-Banner	Banner	Non-Banner
Winter 1859	9/9	10/10	5/5	13/13
Autumn 1860	6/9	5/10	2/5	4/13
Winter 1860	6/9	5/10	2/5	5/13
Summer 1861	6/9	1/10	1/5	1/13
Summer 1862	3/9	0/10	0/5	1/13
Spring 1863	2/9	0/10	0/5	0/13
Spring 1864	0/9	0/10	0/5	0/13

B. All listed incumbents at each endpoint

Roster	Fiscal Banner/total	Judicial Banner/total
Winter 1859	9/19 (47.4%)	5/18 (27.8%)
Autumn 1860	8/18 (44.4%)	2/18 (11.1%)
Winter 1860	8/18 (44.4%)	2/18 (11.1%)
Summer 1861	8/19 (42.1%)	3/18 (16.7%)
Summer 1862	6/19 (31.6%)	2/18 (11.1%)
Spring 1863	3/19 (15.8%)	3/18 (16.7%)
Spring 1864	1/19 (5.3%)	5/18 (27.8%)

Notes: Cohort denominators fix the thirty-seven officials in winter 1859. Endpoint totals include subsequent arrivals. Presence allows transfer and reappearance, so it is not uninterrupted tenure or a monotone survival measure. The Suzhou fiscal vacancy accounts for the smaller 1860 totals.

The endpoint flow accounting in Table 7 uses supplied identifiers for all thirty-seven baseline officials. For each original commission, it distinguishes continued listing there, presence in the other commission, executive listing, and absence from the observed senior targets. The last category is not automatically retirement, death, or departure from government. Cross-commission transfers are counted at the two endpoints, not as all intervening career moves.

For Banner officials, finance satisfies $9 - 0 - 6 + 3 + 0 = 6$ and justice $5 - 3 - 2 + 0 + 2 = 2$, in the order baseline, departures to the other commission, other departures, arrivals from the other commission, and other arrivals. The non-Banner equivalents are $10 - 0 - 10 + 1 + 12 = 13$ and $13 - 1 - 11 + 0 + 15 = 16$. Every contributing person and destination category is in the replication

records. The thirty-seven commission slots are occupied at both endpoints; sixteen Banner or non-Banner fiscal arrivals and seventeen judicial arrivals are not implied by changes in shares alone.

Qian's fiscal appointments for Yuduo, Yilin, and Enlin precede their subsequent fiscal listings. The supplied endpoint links put three Banner and one non-Banner judicial cohort members in finance in summer 1862. The longer Qian follow-up records eventual fiscal appointments for six non-Banner judicial cohort members. These are different horizons, so the latter six are not counted as present in the 1862 fiscal roster.

C.3 Entry, continued service, and retention

The roster comparison uses adjacent dated editions with complete printing of both commissions' slots and gaps no greater than four quarters. It contains twelve earlier pairs and six later pairs. The season-unknown 1860 edition is excluded, so winter 1859 is paired directly with autumn 1860. Entry denotes appearance in an office category without a strict link to that category in the previous usable edition. It includes advancement from elsewhere in government. A continuer remains in the category, possibly in another province.

At each endpoint the listed stock is the sum of entrants and continuers. Accordingly,

$$b_{jt}^{\text{stock}} = \omega_{jt} b_{jt}^{\text{entry}} + (1 - \omega_{jt}) b_{jt}^{\text{continue}}, \quad (8)$$

where ω_{jt} is the entrant fraction. This accounting separates a change in who arrives from a change in everyone listed in an office.

Table C3. Entry, continued service, and the two commissions

Office	Observation group	1854–1859	1860–1864	Change (points)
Fiscal	Entrants	33/77 (42.9%)	7/56 (12.5%)	−30.36
	Continuers	66/151 (43.7%)	27/56 (48.2%)	+4.51
	Listed incumbents	99/228 (43.4%)	34/112 (30.4%)	−13.06
Judicial	Entrants	27/97 (27.8%)	6/63 (9.5%)	−18.31
	Continuers	48/118 (40.7%)	11/45 (24.4%)	−16.23
	Listed incumbents	75/215 (34.9%)	17/108 (15.7%)	−19.14

Notes: Banner person–edition observations divided by all observations in the group. Twelve earlier and six later dated pairs; strict linkage using exact names and at least one agreeing and no conflicting stable attribute. Entrants and continuers sum to the listed stock. Repeated observations of the same person are retained across pairs. Fiscal slots number nineteen, but the Suzhou slot is vacant in autumn and winter 1860, giving $112 = 2 \times 18 + 4 \times 19$ later fiscal observations. Appendix C gives endpoint denominators, date rules, and a supplied-ID linkage comparison.

In finance, the Banner share of entrants falls from 42.9 to 12.5 percent, a decline of 30.36 points. The continuing group remains Banner-heavy: its share rises from 43.7 to 48.2 percent. The stock falls by 13.06 points, substantially less than entry. In justice, both entrants and continuers become less Banner-heavy, and the stock declines by 19.14 points. Looking only at incumbent composition

would rank the judicial decline as larger; looking at entry would rank the fiscal decline as larger. Continued service therefore matters for interpreting the allocation observed in the rosters.

Continued service can also be compared across identities. Table C4 reports, for the same paired editions, the share of each office's incumbents who were listed in the same office category in the next usable edition, by Banner status. Leaving a category can mean promotion as well as removal, and Section 5.2 shows that some exits were promotions. In both commissions Banner incumbents were retained at least as often as non-Banner incumbents: in 1854–1859 the fiscal rates are 66.7 and 65.9 percent and the judicial rates 62.3 and 50.7 percent; in 1860–1864 they are 64.3 against 41.4 percent in finance and 64.7 against 37.4 percent in justice. In executive office the rates are almost equal in 1854–1859, 75.4 and 76.0 percent, and lower for Bannermen in 1860–1864, 53.8 against 67.1 percent, a difference that is not significant ($p = 0.14$ with standard errors clustered by official). In the two commissions, then, the fall in Banner representation came through entry and promotion rather than through Banner incumbents leaving faster than others. The comparison describes how the shares changed; it is not evidence on the court's preferences.

Table C4. Retention in the same office category by Banner status

Office	Period	Banner	Non-Banner	<i>p</i> -value, by official	
				Clustered	Bootstrap
Executive	1854–1859	95/126 (75.4%)	111/146 (76.0%)	0.929	0.921
	1860–1864	28/52 (53.8%)	57/85 (67.1%)	0.139	0.134
Fiscal	1854–1859	66/99 (66.7%)	85/129 (65.9%)	0.915	0.934
	1860–1864	27/42 (64.3%)	29/70 (41.4%)	0.012	0.022
Judicial	1854–1859	48/77 (62.3%)	70/138 (50.7%)	0.197	0.230
	1860–1864	11/17 (64.7%)	34/91 (37.4%)	0.016	0.061

Notes: Incumbents listed in the office category at the start of a paired edition who are listed in the same category, in any province, at its end, divided by all incumbents at the start; strict exact-name linkage and the twelve earlier and six later pairs of Table C3. Executive rows use the recorded governor and governor-general slots in the same pairs. An official appears in several paired editions, so the rows within a cell are not independent observations. The *p*-values test the Banner–non-Banner difference within a row: the first from a regression of retention on Banner status with standard errors clustered by official and *t* critical values with $G - 1$ degrees of freedom, G being the number of officials in the cell (52 to 75); the second from a bootstrap that resamples officials (9,999 draws; twice the share of draws on the far side of zero). The judicial cell of 1860–1864 has nine Banner officials; with so few, the clustered *p*-value is unreliable, and the bootstrap gives 0.061. Officials are identified by their name in the roster, and some appear under variant spellings; merging names that differ in one character and agree on Banner status and on native province or banner, a generous rule that also merges some distinct officials, changes no clustered *p*-value by more than 0.011 (the executive row of 1860–1864 becomes 0.150). A manual review of unlinked names in the replication materials accepts 48 further links, 45 of them for non-Banner officials, so the strict rule understates non-Banner continuity; with those links the two commissions' differences in 1854–1859 close to within about three points and those in 1860–1864 narrow to about 17 and 16 points, while the executive ordering is unchanged. Gong Huang, whom CGED-Q flags as a Bannerman but whom Qian prints without a mark and the rosters record as a native of Tangxi, Zhejiang, is counted as non-Banner here, as in Tables 7, C2, and C3.

C.4 How commissioners left office

The annual chronologies record how each commissioner left office, with dated annotations for promotion, transfer, recall, dismissal, demotion, mourning leave, illness, and death. Table C5 compares the completed tenures of Banner and other commissioners over 1825–1911 under three codings of Banner status. With the question-mark officials counted as non-Banner, Banner fiscal commissioners were less often dismissed, removed, or demoted and more often promoted than other fiscal commissioners, while judicial commissioners showed no difference. With the question-mark officials counted as Bannermen, as in the main coding, the fiscal differences fall to -0.4 and $+6.0$ points and are not significant; the pooled Banner-by-fiscal promotion difference is $+12.9$ points ($p = 0.06$ with normal critical values, 0.08 with t_{17}). The reason is informative about the source: of the 43 completed fiscal tenures of officials marked with a question mark, two ended in promotion. Officials who rose to a governorship are well documented, so their affiliation is known; an unresolved mark is itself associated with a career that stopped below the governorship. The exit comparison is therefore sensitive to a classification that is correlated with the outcome, and the paper does not use it as evidence on the court's preferences.

C.5 Historical appointment sources

Wartime service created opportunities for civil advancement. Yan Jingming administered military supply and camp affairs under Hu Linyi before Hu recommended him for the Hubei judicial commission. Liu Dian served under Zuo Zongtang, and military accomplishments preceded his Zhejiang judicial appointment (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 438, 454). Practical service produced both a record of work and a sponsor able to bring it to the court's attention.

Liu Rong's appointment illustrates the same process in finance. Luo Bingzhang entered Sichuan in 1861 to deal with the Li–Lan uprising. He impeached fiscal commissioner Xiangkui and recommended Liu Rong, a member of his military staff, for the acting commission. Qian dates that replacement to October 1861 (Qian, 1980, p. 1927); the biographies describe the service and recommendation (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 406, 425).

These routes were open to Banner officials too. Yinghan advanced from campaign service and recommendation to the judicial commission in Tongzhi 2 (1863), and to the Anhui fiscal commission in Tongzhi 3 (1864). His spring-1864 judicial listing falls between these two appointments (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 425). His career illustrates the overlap between Banner affiliation, practical experience, and provincial sponsorship.

The distinction between receiving a title and assuming a post is visible in Zeng Guoquan's appointments. He received the Zhejiang judicial commission and then the Jiangsu fiscal commission in 1862. Qian marks the judicial appointment as not assumed (Qian, 1980, p. 2166); the fiscal table separately records his transfer from Zhejiang judicial office (Qian, 1980, p. 1928). His biography records a waiver of the prohibition on serving in the same province as his brother Zeng Guofan

Table C5. How commissioners left office, 1825–1911, under three codings of Banner status

	Fiscal commissioner		Judicial commissioner	
	Negative exit	Promotion	Negative exit	Promotion
<i>Question-mark officials counted as Bannermen (main coding)</i>				
Banner minus non-Banner (pp)	−0.4 (2.3)	+6.0 (4.1)	+0.4 (2.0)	−6.4 (4.7)
Clustered <i>p</i>	0.851	0.150	0.829	0.178
Banner / non-Banner rate (%)	11.6 / 11.9	39.5 / 36.3	6.9 / 6.9	54.1 / 61.7
Banner spells	190		233	
Banner × fiscal, pooled	−0.8 (3.1); +12.9 (6.8)			
<i>Question-mark officials counted as non-Banner</i>				
Banner minus non-Banner (pp)	−6.3 (2.1)	+18.4 (5.1)	−1.7 (2.1)	+0.7 (5.8)
Clustered <i>p</i>	0.002	<0.001	0.416	0.904
Banner / non-Banner rate (%)	6.8 / 13.0	49.7 / 34.2	5.2 / 7.2	59.1 / 59.9
Banner spells	147		154	
Banner × fiscal, pooled	−4.9 (3.2); +19.1 (8.1)			
<i>Marks as printed in each year; question marks non-Banner</i>				
Banner minus non-Banner (pp)	−6.7 (1.9)	+16.8 (5.4)	−1.2 (2.2)	+0.5 (6.4)
Clustered <i>p</i>	<0.001	0.002	0.586	0.934
Banner / non-Banner rate (%)	6.3 / 13.0	48.6 / 34.6	5.6 / 7.1	58.7 / 59.9
Banner spells	142		143	
Banner × fiscal, pooled	−5.7 (3.2); +17.7 (8.5)			

Notes: Completed spells: 787 fiscal and 914 judicial. A spell is a run of consecutive annual listings of one official in one provincial commission; spells running to 1911 and spells whose end is not recorded are excluded. Exits are classified from Qian's dated annotations: negative exits are dismissal, removal, or demotion; promotion is to a higher post. Linear probability models with office-province and exit-decade effects and CR1 standard errors clustered by the eighteen provinces (Jiangning with Jiangsu, Taiwan with Fujian, Xinjiang with Gansu). Clustered *p*-values in this table use normal critical values; with the t_{17} critical values used elsewhere they are larger (question marks non-Banner: fiscal negative exits 0.002 becomes 0.008 and fiscal promotion <0.001 becomes 0.002; marks as printed: fiscal negative exits <0.001 becomes 0.003 and fiscal promotion 0.002 becomes 0.006). The pooled row gives the Banner-by-fiscal interaction for negative exits and for promotion in a regression of both commissions. The Suzhou and Jiangning fiscal commissions are separate offices.

because of military urgency (Zhao et al., 1928, juan 413). Titles could advance an official's standing during campaign service even without a completed tenure in the first post.

The court also distinguished nomination from preparation for office. An instruction in Tongzhi 5 permitted recommendations of able men but prohibited claiming a specified imperial-choice vacancy for a nominee (Qing court, n.d.a, juan 61, lunar month 11, guihai). A later order required certain nominees lacking substantive circuit or prefectural experience to serve in a circuit post and undergo assessment (Qing court, n.d.b, juan 273, Tongzhi 8, lunar month 12, renxu). These post-Taiping instructions articulate the court's concern with relevant service and control over appointment. The cases establish actual routes of advancement, in which experience and sponsorship worked together.

Table C6 lists the sources and recorded sequences for the appointment histories discussed in Section 5.

Table C6. Appointment histories and source locators

Case	Source	Recorded sequence
Yan Jingming	<i>Qing shi gao</i> , juan 438	Supply and camp service under Hu Linyi preceded recommendation for Hubei judicial office.
Liu Dian	<i>Qing shi gao</i> , juan 454	Service under Zuo Zongtang preceded Zhejiang judicial appointment.
Liu Rong	<i>Qing shi gao</i> , juan 406, 425; Qian p. 1927	Luo Bingzhang removed Xiangkui and recommended Liu Rong for acting Sichuan fiscal office in 1861.
Yinghan	<i>Qing shi gao</i> , juan 425; CGED-Q spring 1864	Judicial promotion in Tongzhi 2 (1863); fiscal promotion in Tongzhi 3 (1864). The spring-1864 judicial listing is consistent with that order.
Zeng Guoquan	<i>Qing shi gao</i> , juan 413; Qian pp. 2166, 1928	Judicial appointment marked not assumed (p. 2166); subsequent fiscal transfer separately recorded (p. 1928). Military urgency supported a kinship waiver.
Appointment preparation	<i>Muzong shilu</i> , juan 273; Tongzhi 8, month 12, renxu	Certain nominees without substantive circuit or prefectural experience were to serve and undergo assessment before assuming a commission.

Notes: Chronologies establish appointments and notations; rosters establish listing in an edition; biographies describe prior service and sponsorship. The instruction postdates the principal cohort. Source images or electronic passage locators are documented in the replication materials.

C.6 The 1854 Hubei appointment: sources

Section 2.2 summarizes this episode; this appendix sets out the sources. In October 1854, after the Hunan Army of Zeng Guofan and regular troops retook Wuchang, the court confirmed Yang Pei, a Hanjun Bannerman, as governor-general of Huguang and, as a reward for the victory, made Zeng acting governor of Hubei; a court letter to the commanders the same day added that the campaign mattered more than the province. A week later it withdrew Zeng's appointment, gave him instead the rank of vice-minister of war, and named Tao Enpei, the Jiangsu fiscal commissioner, governor, with Yang Pei acting until Tao arrived (Qing court, n.d.c, juan 144–145).

Thirty-three years later Xue Fucheng, who had joined Zeng's staff in 1865, wrote that when the news of Wuchang arrived a chief minister told the emperor that Zeng, a vice-minister at home in mourning, was “no more than a commoner; that a commoner in his village can raise more than ten thousand followers with one call may not be a blessing for the state.” The emperor, Xue writes, fell silent and his countenance changed for a long time, and as a result Zeng could not fully pursue his aims for seven or eight years (Xue, 1887). Xue names neither the minister nor his informant. In a companion essay he says that Qi Junzao obstructed Zeng, and praises the Manchu grand secretary Wenqing for urging the court to rely on Han officials, to break down the barrier between Manchu and Han, and to back Zeng (Xue, 1887); Qi was himself Han. A compilation of 1914 names Qi as the speaker (Huang, 1914, juan 48), and Zhu Dong'an has argued that it was another minister (Zhu, 1985, as reported by Kikuchi, 2017). The official record gives other reasons. Later edicts say that Zeng, who was to take his fleet down the Yangzi, “could no longer be tied to the duties of an office,” and the emperor's rescript on Zeng's memorial declining the post says that he had expected Zeng

to decline and that an acting governorship would be “a name without substance,” and reprimands him severely for omitting the acting title (Qing court, n.d.c, juan 145–146). Three censors had memorialized three days before the reversal, asking that Zeng be left free for the campaign. Kikuchi counts these censors, from Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, among the Han elites of the southeast who resented the rise of the Hunan commanders, and reads the reversal as the emperor’s fear of Han forces outside the bureaucracy together with the opposition of those elites (Kikuchi, 2017). Xue also records that in 1862 a second chief minister urged that the Hunan armies be withdrawn and Zeng’s authority curtailed, because it had grown “too great, with the danger that the tail becomes too large to wag”; the grand councillors, he adds, laughed at the proposal, because the throne was relying on Zeng to defeat the rebels (Xue, 1887).

D Provincial Military Command and Source Ambiguity

Provincial *tidu* commanded within the Green Standard establishment, distinct from Banner garrison generals. The Banner and garrison organization is described in *Qing shi gao*, juan 130; Green Standard organization in juan 131; the defense armies and modern army in juan 132. These branches do not constitute one uniform set of provincial vacancies. Metropolitan, frontier, Yangtze naval, and modern-navy commands are kept separate from the provincial *tidu* population.

The source ledger contains 1,914 independent boldface name–year–office records: 1,633 provincial *tidu*, 114 metropolitan, 101 separate frontier, 55 supraprovincial naval, and eleven modern-navy records. The provincial subset covers thirteen provinces and 1,124 province-years before onset exclusions. It does not cover all military command, including Banner garrisons and regional-army leadership.

Identity marks are an additional source of uncertainty. Qian’s “Han” mark denotes Hanjun rather than the unmarked ordinary Han category. Question marks indicate uncertain precise affiliation associated by the compiler with Banner origins; final biographical affiliation may not establish contemporaneous status in every prior appointment year. Among provincial *tidu* records, 54 have explicit positive marks and 114 have question marks. Table D1 reports three transparent coding policies rather than choosing a policy for its estimated sign. The estimates use the two-way design of Equation (7), not the stacked comparison, and the first row treats question marks as the main civil coding does.

Table D1. Provincial military estimates under alternative identity-mark policies

Policy	Internal	External	External minus internal	Contrast wild p	N
Include source question marks	−9.71 (14.98)	+9.28 (5.30)	+18.99 (17.79)	0.3201	1,102
Explicit marks only	+10.89 (6.61)	+0.55 (1.85)	−10.34 (7.82)	0.2090	1,102
Omit question-mark records	+7.75 (8.65)	+0.52 (2.49)	−7.23 (10.35)	0.5002	1,058

Notes: Early-window estimates in recorded Banner percentage points; province-clustered CR1 standard errors. Thirteen clusters, both war types and windows, province and year effects, and 4,096 null-imposed sign pairs. Explicit-only coding keeps question-mark records in the denominator without assigning a positive Banner mark; it does not establish that those people were non-Banner. Omission removes those records before forming the outcome.

Both the direction and precision of the military comparison depend on identity treatment. The civil estimates do not use this series. Military command remains relevant to the historical question, but a combined civil–military average would mix these classification uncertainties with the civil-office responses.